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INTRODUCTION 
The story of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
(CDA)1 is one of legislative action and inaction, justice and in-
justice, and the weighing of priorities and values. Its origin and 
entrenchment reveal a great deal about the values of the tech-
nology industry and the U.S. Congress. Passed in 1996, the 
CDA was an attempt by Congress to accommodate competing 
values and facilitate an uncertain but promising future digital 
world. Since that time, this digital world has changed drastical-
ly. Some argue that § 230 is in part responsible for the growth 
of the digital economy and the “Internet as we know it.” Others 
argue that the “Internet as we know it” is not what we want it 
to be, particularly when it comes to sex trafficking, pornogra-
phy, child sex-abuse images, and exploitation. It is clear that, 
whatever § 230 did for the legitimate digital economy, it also 
did for the illicit digital economy. 
                                                                                                                               
 1. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
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Nowhere is this more apparent than in the world of sex traf-
ficking. Since its recognition under federal law in 2000,2 human 
trafficking has been identified as the fastest growing criminal 
enterprise in the world.3 The International Labour Organiza-
tion released its Global Estimate on Modern Slavery and con-
cluded that forty million people in the world are victims of 
modern slavery, including sexual slavery, and that women and 
girls comprise 99% of victims of forced sexual exploitation, 
with 25% of those victims being children.4 This growth, which 
has similar trends in the United States, is largely attributed to 
the use of the Internet to facilitate the sale of human beings, 
including children, for rape and sexual abuse. While exact 
numbers are difficult to ascertain, it is beyond dispute that the 
use of online advertising to facilitate sex trafficking is a signifi-
cant factor in the increase of this form of victimization.5 
Yet, when survivors6 or state prosecutors attempt to hold lia-
ble the very service providers who permit the advertising of 
sex-trafficking victims—including children—for sale in the 
largest market to buy human beings in the world, § 230 ties 
                                                                                                                               
 2. See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 
1466 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.). 
 3. See id. § 102(b)(8). 
 4. See ALLIANCE 8.7, GLOBAL ESTIMATES OF MODERN SLAVERY: FORCED LABOR 
AND FORCED MARRIAGE 5, 39 (2017) (in partnership with the International Labour 
Office of the ILO). 
 5 . See, e.g., STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 114TH 
CONG., BACKPAGE.COM’S KNOWING FACILITATION OF ONLINE SEX TRAFFICKING 4–
5 (2016); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CHILD EXPLOITA-
TION PREVENTION AND INTERDICTION: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 10 (2016); MERE-
DITH DANK ET AL., URBAN INST., ESTIMATING THE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF THE 
UNDERGROUND COMMERCIAL SEX ECONOMY IN EIGHT MAJOR US CITIES 237–38 
(2014); DOMINIQUE ROE-SEPOWITZ ET AL., ARIZ. STATE UNIV., A SIX YEAR ANALYSIS 
OF SEX TRAFFICKERS OF MINORS 13, 42 (2017) (finding traffickers used online ad-
vertisements in nearly two-thirds of cases studied and that “Backpage.com being 
involved in cases of sex trafficking of minors is a constant theme in sex trafficking 
arrests”). 
 6. Legal literature, advocacy, and policy pieces use the terms “survivor” and 
“victim” interchangeably. This Article follows the pattern of the U.S. Council on 
Human Trafficking, a survivor advisory group to the White House on human 
trafficking, and utilizes both terms. See generally U.S. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HU-
MAN TRAFFICKING, ANNUAL REPORT (2016). It is the view of the Author that re-
gardless of the label, people who have lived through sex trafficking are survivors. 
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their hands.7 Defendant websites use § 230 as a sword and ar-
gue that it affords such sites immunity from liability, even if 
accused of participating in child sex trafficking. Despite con-
sensus that § 230 was never designed to create such absolute 
immunity, courts have struggled to reconcile precedent from 
an earlier Internet era with the reality of slavery8 in the current 
Internet age. The result has been an inability of sex-trafficking 
victims and state prosecutors to proceed with cases against 
such businesses that knowingly facilitate sex trafficking. 
Since the emergence of this unintended reality, many have 
called on Congress to update § 230 and address this problem. 
More recently, sex-trafficking survivors, 9 all fifty state attor-
                                                                                                                               
 7. See generally Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act of 2017: Hearing on S. 1693 Before 
the S. Comm. on Com., Sci. and Transp., 115th Cong. (2017) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 
1693] (statement of Xavier Becerra, Att’y Gen. of California). 
 8. The label of human trafficking as modern-day slavery is well accepted with 
two American presidents, the Department of Justice, the United States Congress, 
the United Nations, the United States State Department, federal courts, and Pope 
Francis all invoking the term. See respectively, for example, Proclamation No. 
9074, 3 C.F.R. 9074 (Dec. 31, 2012) (Proclamation by President Obama regarding 
National Slavery and Human Trafficking Prevention Month); President Barack 
Obama, Remarks by the President to the Clinton Global Initiative (Sept. 25, 2012) 
(transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/25/
remarks-president-clinton-global-initiative [https://perma.cc/KE95-A8RP]); President 
George W. Bush, Statement by His Excellency Mr. George W. Bush, President of 
the United States of America: Address to the United Nations General Assembly 
(Sept. 23, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/
statements/usaeng030923.htm [http://perma.cc/6PU8-7BQ7]); U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales Announces Creation of Human Trafficking 
Prosecution Unit Within the Civil Rights Division (Jan. 31, 2007), http://
www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/January/07_crt_060.html [http://perma.cc/
RH99-BAUB]; 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a), (b)(1); Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary-General’s Message 
on the International Day for the Abolition of Slavery, UNITED NATIONS (Dec. 2, 2013), 
http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=7321 [http://perma.cc/6ATD-D7MJ]; John 
Kerry, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks at the Annual Trafficking in Persons Report 
(June 19, 2013) (transcript available at http://m.state.gov/md210911.htm [http://
perma.cc/L64A-QN5U]); Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks at 
Release of the Ninth Annual Trafficking in Persons Report (June 16, 2009) (tran-
script available at http://m.state.gov/md124872.htm [http://perma.cc/2G32-




 9. See generally LINDA SMITH ET AL., JOINT STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO TECH 
INDUSTRY OBSTRUCTION OF SECTION 230 LEGISLATION, https://sharedhope.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/Joint-Statement-in-Response-to-Tech-Industry-
Obstruction-of-Section-230-Legislation-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR9F-3E8J]. 
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neys general,10 and a growing number of courts11 have called 
on Congress to amend § 230 to restore it to its original purpose 
of providing limited, not nearly absolute, protections for inter-
active computer services. Congress has failed to act thusfar. 
Nevertheless, in 2017, two bills (one in each chamber) have 
been proposed to address this reality. 
This Article examines the development of the jurisprudence 
regarding online advertising of sex-trafficking victims and jux-
taposes the forces that created § 230 with those preventing its 
timely amendment. This Article argues that, although § 230 
was never intended to create a regime of absolute immunity for 
defendant websites, a perverse interpretation of the non-sex-
trafficking jurisprudence for § 230 has created a regime of de 
facto absolute immunity from civil liability or enforcement of 
state sex-trafficking laws. This phenomenon occurred despite 
the legislative intent behind § 230, and despite the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act of 2000 (“TVPA”)12 and its subsequent 
reauthorizations.13 Part I explains the impetus behind § 230, its 
history, and its text. Part II examines the rise in recognition of 
sex trafficking in both domestic and international law. It fur-
ther summarizes the contours of sex trafficking in the modern 
world and the role online advertisement has played in its 
emergence. Part III analyzes the intersection of sex trafficking, 
the Internet, and § 230 and thoroughly assesses the develop-
ment of jurisprudence culminating in the creation of a regime 
of de facto immunity. Part IV analyzes recent legislative efforts 
in both the House and Senate, arguing that the twenty-two-
                                                                                                                               
 10 . See Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen. to Congress Regarding 
Amendment of Communications Decency Act (Aug. 16, 2017), available at http://
www.naag.org/assets/redesign/files/sign-on-letter/CDA%20Final%20Letter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5T2D-EGDY]. 
 11. See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 29 (1st Cir. 2016); 
M.A. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1058 (E.D. Mo. 2011). 
 12. Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1466 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.). 
 13. See Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, 129 Stat. 
227 (2015); William Wilberforce Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008); Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthor-
ization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558 (2006); Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (2003); 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2013, H.R. 898, 113th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 2013). 
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year-old statute must be amended to reflect current realities of 
both the Internet and sex trafficking. Furthermore, it asserts 
that such an amendment is necessary to return § 230 to its orig-
inal purpose of protecting some Internet companies from spe-
cific types of liability, without creating absolute immunity. 
I. SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT 
A. Historical Roots 
In 1996 the Internet was in its infancy and Congress was 
struggling with the implications of its development. The Inter-
net of 1996 is unrecognizable today.14 That “new” “dial up” 
Internet engine connected people through a novel and experi-
mental “bulletin board” through which events could be orga-
nized.15 Newspapers were just considering having an online 
presence.16 “Google” was not a verb, and online research was 
described as “tough for the amateur researcher.” 17 Congres-
sional debate discussed floppy disk drives, usenet groups, and 
message boards over telephone lines. 18 In this climate, Con-
gress could not have imagined what the Internet would look 
like two decades into the twenty-first century. 
Congress did, however, recognize a concern about online ex-
ploitation. Congress’s concern was not sex trafficking because 
such a term was not recognized at the time. Rather, Congress 
acknowledged and expressed concern about the potential of 
                                                                                                                               
 14. See, e.g., Nicholas Carlson, Presenting: This is What the Internet Looked Like in 
1996, BUS. INSIDER AUS. (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.businessinsider.com.au/the-
coolest-web-sites-from-1996-2014-4#-1 [https://perma.cc/PVB3-N2W2]; Farhad 
Manjoo, Jurassic Web, SLATE (Feb. 24, 2009), http://www.slate.com/articles/
technology/technology/2009/02/jurassic_web.html [https://perma.cc/B6U9-KDQS]. 
 15. See Joan E. Rigdon, Internet’s Top Use: Information Bureau, ASIAN WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 14, 1996, at 4. 
 16. See Peter H. Lewis, The New York Times Introduces a Website, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
22, 1996, at D7. 
 17. Bart Ziegler, The Internet – How Can I Find What I Am Looking For?, ASIAN 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1996, at S10. 
 18. See, e.g., Cyberporn and Children: The Scope of the Problem, the State of the Tech-
nology, and the Need for Congressional Action: Hearing on S. 892, a Bill to Amend Sec. 
1464 of Title 18, U.S.C., To Punish Transmission by Computer of Indecent Material to 
Minors, before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 136, 161, 181 (1995). 
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the Internet to spread or expose children to obscene material.19 
Section 230 was a component of a broader effort to limit access 
to explicit material through the Internet. The CDA intended to 
limit such access and was attached to Title V of the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996.20 The CDA prohibited the knowing 
dissemination of obscene material to children, and sought to 
incentivize telecommunication companies to participate in 
blocking explicit material from reaching children.21 Section 230 
was added to the CDA to protect tech companies. In Reno v. 
ACLU,22 the Supreme Court struck down as vague some of the 
more controversial criminal provisions of the CDA, such as the 
prohibition on the transmission of “indecent material.”23 How-
ever, § 230 was not challenged, and this protection remains ef-
fective law to this day. 24  In fact, tech companies arguably 
achieved the best of both worlds. After Reno, much of the CDA 
that tech companies opposed was eliminated, but the provision 
that was designed to protect them remained. Thus, when the 
dust settled, tech companies enjoyed increased protections 
without the regulations. 
The statute itself explicitly outlines the purposes of § 230. 
The text cannot be fully understood, however, without the con-
text of its addition to the CDA. Because the CDA regulates the 
Internet, many tech companies opposed it in principle and 
fought it at every opportunity.25 In this climate, a state court 
                                                                                                                               
 19. See 141 CONG. REC. 15,503 (1995) (statement of Sen. Exon, author of the 
CDA) (“The fundamental purpose of the Communications Decency Act is to pro-
vide much needed protection for children.”). 
 20. Pub. L. No. 104-104, §§ 501–09, 551–52, 561, 110 Stat. 56, 133–37, 139–43 
(1996) (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 21. See S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 59 (1995); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 881 
(1997). 
 22. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 23. See id. at 849. 
 24. See id. at 862, 879. 
 25. See Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon's Communications 
Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, FED. COMMC’NS 
L.J. 51, 74 n.112 (1996); see also Cyberporn and Children, supra note 18, at 72–73; Child 
Pornography on the Internet: Hearing on The “Protection of Children from Computer 
Pornography Act of 1995” Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) 
(testimony of Jerry Berman, Executive Director of the Center for Democracy and 
Technology); 141 CONG. REC. 19,883–84 (1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy, introduc-
ing the Report of Interactive Working Group on Parental Empowerment, Child 
Protection and Free Speech in Interactive Media); Carlin Meyer, Reclaiming Sex 
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decision caused Congress to respond to tech companies’ con-
cerns about regulation and liability. 
In 1995, the New York Superior Court decided Stratton 
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.26 Prodigy operated a bulle-
tin board called “Money Talks,” where members could post 
information about the financial world. Widely read in the fi-
nancial sector, Prodigy held itself out as a “family-oriented” 
corporation that edited material placed on its bulletin boards 
that it considered inappropriate. 27  Stratton Oakmont sued 
Prodigy for libel for statements placed on the Money Talks bul-
letin board, and the state court found Prodigy responsible for 
that content in part because of its active role in screening out 
any material it found inappropriate.28 Prodigy lost its protec-
tion as a mere distributor of third-party information. The court 
labeled it a publisher of the information and thus responsible 
for material it published. The court found Prodigy to be a pub-
lisher under state law because “it voluntarily deleted some 
messages . . . and was therefore legally responsible for the con-
tent of defamatory messages that it failed to delete.”29 
Opponents of the CDA had already expressed the concern 
that if the CDA were interpreted broadly, service providers 
would be held criminally liable for providing minors with ac-
cess to the Internet. 30  As the Fourth Circuit has observed, 
“Congress enacted § 230 to remove the disincentives to self-
regulation created by the Stratton Oakmont decision.” 31  This 
case, and the concerns expressed by tech companies (including 
Prodigy), prompted Congress to add § 230 to the CDA.32 Just 
                                                                                                                               
from the Pornographers: Cybersexual Possibilities, 83 GEO. L.J. 1969, 1983 n.77 (1995) 
(commenting on impossibility of monitoring all transmissions over server com-
puters). 
 26. No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), superseded by statute, 
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230, as recognized in Shiamilli v. 
Real Est. Grp. of New York, Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 2011). 
 27. Id. at *2. 
 28. Id. at *4. 
 29. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 
F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Stratton, 1995 WL 323710, at *4). 
 30. See Child Pornography on the Internet, supra note 26. 
 31. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 32. See Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1163. Congressman Christopher Cox, who would 
later become a paid lobbyist for the tech industry, cosponsored § 230 to protect 
companies “who take[] steps to screen indecency and offensive material for their 
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five weeks after the Stratton Oakmont decision, the text of what 
would become § 230 was introduced in the House.33 
B. Purpose 
According to the Conference Report, “One of the specific 
purposes of [§ 230] is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy 
and any other similar decisions which have treated such pro-
viders . . . as publishers or speakers of content that is not their 
own because they have restricted access to objectionable mate-
rial.”34 Congress, therefore, sought to address two goals with 
§ 230. First, consistent with the CDA’s effort to protect children 
from access to obscene or explicit materials, Congress sought to 
“’encourage telecommunications and information service pro-
viders to deploy new technologies and policies’ to block or fil-
ter offensive material.”35 On the other hand, it did not want 
companies to over-screen, as Congress recognized the desire 
for the Internet to reach its full potential as “a forum for a true 
diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cul-
tural development, and myriad of avenues for intellectual ac-
tivity.”36 
The plain language of § 230 also provides insight into this 
dual purpose by outlining five separate policies of the United 
States as they existed in 1996. The first two speak to a prefer-
ence for an Internet with little regulation: 
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet 
and other interactive computer services and other interactive 
media; 
                                                                                                                               
customers.” 141 CONG. REC. 21,999 (1995). Ironically, although Stratton Oakmont 
won that defamation lawsuit, in 1999 its executives pled guilty to a seven-year 
scheme of stock manipulation and fraud. See Edward Wyatt, Stratton Oakmont 
Executives Admit Stock Manipulation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1999, at C3. 
 33. See H.R. 1978, 104th Cong. (1995). 
 34. H. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
 35. Danielle Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Won’t Break, 86 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 401, 404 (2017) (quoting S. REP. NO. 104–23 (1995)). 
 36. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (2012)); see also Back-
page.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805, 824 (M.D. Tenn. 2013). The opposi-
tion to the CDA generally included a concern that the Internet would be stifled, 
that it would be impossible to monitor platforms, and that speech might be chilled 
due to over-screening. See, e.g., Cyberporn and Children, supra note 18, at 9, 14. 
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(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that 
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive com-
puter services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation[.]37 
The remaining three, however, speak to Congress’s equal goal 
of shielding children and others from explicit material and, 
more specifically, incentivizing technology companies to de-
velop technology to block such material: 
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which 
maximize user control over what information is received by 
individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and 
other interactive computer services; 
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utiliza-
tion of blocking and filtering technologies that empower 
parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or 
inappropriate online material; and 
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws 
to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and 
harassment by means of computer.38 
Congress enacted § 230 believing that it was “devising a lim-
ited safe harbor from liability for online providers engaged in 
self-regulation.” 39 Importantly, nothing in the language sug-
gests Congress contemplated any sort of absolute immunity. To 
the contrary, Senator Grassley specifically rejected the views of 
“free-speech absolutists” who believe that “Congress has no 
role at all to play in protecting America’s children . . . .”40 
C. Text 
In recognition of its dual purpose, § 230(c) provides in rele-
vant part: 
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening 
of offensive material 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker. No provider or user 
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by anoth-
er information content provider. 
                                                                                                                               
 37. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(2). 
 38. Id. § 230(b)(3)–(5). 
 39. Citron & Wittes, supra note 35, at 403 (emphasis added). 
 40. 142 CONG. REC. 1993 (1996) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
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(2) Civil liability. No provider or user of an interactive com-
puter service shall be held liable on account of— 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict 
access to or availability of material that the provider or 
user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectiona-
ble, whether or not such material is constitutionally pro-
tected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to in-
formation content providers or others the technical 
means to restrict access to material described in para-
graph (1).41 
Section 230(c)(1) is the first source of protections for an inter-
active computer service. 42  Under § 230(c)(1) an interactive 
computer service is protected from claims that it acted as a 
publisher or speaker of content created by a third party. That is 
to say, essential to the analysis of a claim against a service is 
whether the claim treats the provider as a publisher or speaker 
of another’s words. If so, this law precludes such a cause of ac-
tion. There is no indication in the text or legislative history of 
the CDA that an interactive computer service could be protect-
ed for content it created. Indeed, Congress defined an “infor-
mation content provider” as “any person or entity that is re-
sponsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development 
of information provided through the Internet or any other in-
teractive computer service.”43 A party “can be both an interac-
tive computer service and a content provider.”44 If the party is 
a content provider, then the plain language of the statute offers 
it no protection. 
Second, § 230(c)(2) provides protection for a service provider 
who takes actions “in good faith to restrict access to or availa-
bility of material that the provider or user considers to be ob-
                                                                                                                               
 41. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). 
 42. “The term ‘interactive computer service’ means any information service, 
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by 
multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that 
provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by 
libraries or educational institutions.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). 
 43. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). 
 44. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 
F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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scene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable” or provides access to technology to do 
the same.45 Through this provision, “Congress sought to im-
munize the removal of user-generated content, not the creation 
of content.”46 
The final indication that Congress envisioned limited protec-
tion was its rather lengthy list of laws not affected by the pro-
tections included in § 230(c). Not only does the statute provide 
that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to impair the 
enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relat-
ing to obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of chil-
dren) of title 18, or any other Federal criminal statute.”47 The stat-
ute also does not “prevent any State from enforcing any State 
law that is consistent with this section.”48 Finally, it has no ef-
fect on communications privacy law or intellectual property 
law.49 
These provisions reflect Congress’s attempt to strike a bal-
ance between limiting access to explicit material and incentiviz-
ing service providers to police their platforms and develop 
technologies that allow for screening. Congress sought to ac-
complish these goals by allowing the Internet to flourish with 
limited regulation. Congress expressly stated that that it is the 
policy of the United States “to ensure vigorous enforcement of 
Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscen-
ity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.”50 That 
said, Congress appeared to recognize that unlimited tort-based 
lawsuits would threaten the then-fragile Internet and the 
                                                                                                                               
 45. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). 
 46. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1163. 
 47. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (emphasis added). This was echoed even by opponents 
of the CDA who argued that child exploitation was already illegal under federal 
law. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. 27,969 (1995) (statement of Sen. Feingold); Cyberporn 
and Children, supra note 18, at 15. 
 48. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). This provision does, however, preclude liability im-
posed through a state law inconsistent with § 230. Id. 
 49. Id. § 230(e)(2), (4). 
 50. Id. § 230(b)(5). 
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“freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medi-
um.”51 
Although these two goals required some balancing, it is clear 
from the text and legislative history of § 230 that it was never 
intended to provide a form of absolute immunity for any and 
all actions taken by interactive computer services. Section 230 is 
not “a general prohibition of civil liability for web-site opera-
tors and other online content hosts.”52 Rather, Congress sought 
to provide limited protections for limited actions. 
As this Article will discuss, the jurisprudence in this area as 
it relates to sex trafficking has come unmoored, suggesting a de 
facto absolute immunity from civil suit and state prosecution 
for partnering with human traffickers. Prior to analyzing this 
case law, it is necessary to understand the equally clear intent 
of Congress to eliminate sex trafficking. 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF SEX TRAFFICKING AND CLEAR 
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO COMBAT IT 
Noticeably absent from the list of offenses unaffected by 
§ 230 are the human trafficking offenses present in federal 
criminal law and the laws of all fifty states. The reason for this 
is simple: the nation and the world did not codify human traf-
ficking as a crime until four years after the passage of § 230. 
A. Sex Trafficking Legislation 
2000 was a watershed year for the law’s recognition of hu-
man trafficking generally and sex trafficking in particular. The 
world came together to draft the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, 
and Punish the Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and 
Children (Palermo Protocol).53 This document reflected the in-
ternational community’s condemnation of human trafficking, 
and it included a comprehensive definition of human traffick-
                                                                                                                               
 51. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). Specifically, 
Congress was concerned that over-screening would lead to a decrease in the 
number or types of messages circulated. Id. at 331. 
 52. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 
F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 53. This is one of three optional protocols to the United Nations Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime. See G.A. Res. 55/25, at 31 (Jan. 8, 2001). 
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ing. It further committed parties to create multidisciplinary 
laws to address labor and sex trafficking. The United States 
mirrored this growing recognition of human trafficking by 
passing the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 
(TVPA),54 which defined and prohibited severe forms of traf-
ficking. 
In its recognition of sex trafficking as a “severe form[] of traf-
ficking,” Congress included lengthy findings, among which 
were the findings that human trafficking was “modern day 
slavery,” that it was “the fastest growing source of profits for 
organized criminal enterprises in the world,” and that its per-
petrators perniciously “primarily target women and girls, who 
are disproportionately affected by poverty, the lack of access to 
education, chronic unemployment, discrimination, and the lack 
of economic opportunities.” 55  Congress explicitly acknowl-
edged the importance of combatting this crime: 
Trafficking in persons is a transnational crime with national 
implications. To deter international trafficking and bring its 
perpetrators to justice, nations including the United States 
must recognize that trafficking is a serious offense. This is 
done by prescribing appropriate punishment, giving priority 
to the prosecution of trafficking offenses, and protecting ra-
ther than punishing the victims of such offenses.56 
Importantly, Congress recognized in 2000 that existing legis-
lation, which included the CDA, was “inadequate to deter traf-
ficking and bring traffickers to justice, failing to reflect the 
gravity of the offenses involved.”57 
This direct language indicated Congress’s clear intent to rad-
ically affect and confront human trafficking. 58 The approach 
Congress advanced to combat human trafficking became 
known as the “Four P’s”: protection, prevention, prosecution, 
and partnership.59 This comprehensive effort adopted a “vic-
                                                                                                                               
 54 . Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1466 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7112 
(2012)). 
 55. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(1), (4), (8), (19) (2012). 
 56. Id. § 102(b)(24). 
 57. Id. § 102(b)(14). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 3 PS: PROSECUTION, PROTECTION, AND PREVENTION, 
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tim-centered approach” to combat trafficking. In the original 
TVPA, Congress recognized that human trafficking could not 
be eliminated solely through federal criminal law, but instead 
required diverse stakeholders to participate and support the 
rights of victims. 60  The hallmarks of this Congressional ap-
proach included a comprehensive methodology that encom-
passed not only criminal sanctions, but also civil lawsuits, 
recognition of the essential role of states in combatting human 
trafficking, and recognition of the need to provide victims and 
survivors with access to justice through civil private rights of 
action.61 
This approach created a structure to revisit the legislation 
regularly through reauthorizations updating Congress’s legal 
framework as it continued to gain more knowledge about the 
many forms of human trafficking. Congress had a clear intent 
to pursue an aggressive approach to human trafficking in 2000, 
and its fidelity to this approach is evinced through its five reau-
thorizations.62 
1. Definition of Sex Trafficking 
Sex trafficking includes the acts of one who “knowing-
ly . . . recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, 
advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a 
person . . . to engage in a commercial sex act.”63 To be convicted 
of such an offense, a defendant must use “force, fraud, or coer-
cion . . . to cause the victim to engage in [the] commercial sex 
act,” or the victim must be under the age of eighteen.64 It is also 
unlawful to benefit, “financially or by receiving anything of 
value, from participation” in a sex trafficking venture.65 There-
fore, if one engages in any of the above acts with a person who 
has been forced, defrauded or coerced into participating in a 
commercial sex act, or with a minor participating in a commer-
                                                                                                                               
20, 2017); see also INT’L HUMAN TRAFFICKING INST., THE PROBLEM, http://
theihti.org/the-problem/ [https://perma.cc/PJZ6-7JFB] (last visited Nov. 20, 2017). 
 60. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(10). 
 61. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. 16,705 (statement of Sen. Wellstone). 
 62. See supra note 13 for TVPA reauthorizations. 
 63. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2012). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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cial sex act (regardless of coercion), one has committed the 
crime of sex trafficking. A commercial sex act includes “any sex 
act on account of which anything of value is given to or re-
ceived by any person.”66 These comprehensive definitions cov-
er more than just traditional prostitution; they also include oth-
er methods of sexual exploitation. Similarly, they apply not on-
only to pimps, but also to anyone who participates and benefits 
from such exploitation. Thus, it is clear that Congress intended 
a comprehensive attack on sex trafficking from the beginning. 
2. Multidisciplinary Approach with Emphasis on Victims 
Congress also recognized that sex trafficking could not be 
ended only through purely federal criminal law and found that 
a civil right of action is necessary to combat human trafficking. 
In 2003, Congress explicitly authorized a private right of action 
for sex-trafficking victims to enforce the criminal sex-
trafficking laws, thus providing them with access to justice and 
also empowering them to participate in achieving the TVPA’s 
goals.67 In 2015, Congress increased compensation and restitu-
tion for victims, reiterating the importance of victim access to 
funds to address the long-term harms caused by human traf-
ficking.68 
In addition to adopting the victim-centered approach and the 
right of a federal civil enforcement action, Congress also recog-
nized the need to combat sex trafficking at state and local levels 
of government. In 2005, Congress explicitly acknowledged the 
essential role of local law enforcement and prosecutors by add-
ing a section to the TVPA entitled “Enhancing State and Local 
Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Persons.”69 This section estab-
lished grants to “establish, develop, expand, or strengthen pro-
                                                                                                                               
 66. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(4) (2012). 
 67. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (2012); see also, e.g., Kathleen Kim & Kusia Hresh-
chyshyn, Human Trafficking Private Right of Action: Civil Rights for the Trafficked 
Person in the United States, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 4 (2004) (recognizing that, 
because public enforcement lacks resources to enforce civil rights of human traf-
ficking victims, including these private rights of actions in the trafficking statutes 
“is indicative that the state is willing to rely on private actors to enforce the civil 
rights of trafficked persons”). 
 68. See Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, § 105, 
129 Stat. 236. 
 69. 34 U.S.C. § 20705 (2012) 
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grams . . . to investigate and prosecute acts of severe forms of 
trafficking in persons.”70 In so doing, Congress required that 
such local entities embrace a multidisciplinary approach advo-
cated by Congress.71 Indeed, the State Department’s most re-
cent Trafficking in Persons Report recognized the critical role 
state and local prosecutions play in this effort, noting that most 
prosecutions of human trafficking are based on state laws.72 
For nearly the past two decades, congressional intent to 
combat sex trafficking has been unyielding and comprehen-
sive. Congress is the architect of a multi-disciplinary approach 
that employs the use of a private right of action, a focus on vic-
tims, and state and local law enforcement to combat sex traf-
ficking at all levels of society. 
3. Obstacle to Achieving the TVPA’s Goal to Ending Sex Trafficking 
Notwithstanding this comprehensive approach, sex traffick-
ing appears to continue to thrive throughout the world and 
across the country. As a threshold matter, it must be noted that 
accurate numbers are difficult to ascertain due to the under-
ground nature of sex trafficking, as well as the definitional var-
iations among different studies. Nevertheless, global estimates 
confirm a trend of increasing numbers of trafficking victims.73 
There are 5.9 adult victims of modern slavery for every 1,000 
adults in the world, and 4.4 child victims for every 1,000 chil-
dren in the world.74 Consistent with congressional findings in 
2000, 99% of the victims that the International Labour Organi-
zation characterizes as “sex slaves” are women and girls. 75 
Notwithstanding such estimates, the U.S. Department of State 
reported that in 2016 the legal systems of countries throughout 
the world only identified approximately 66,520 victims. 76 
                                                                                                                               
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. § 20705(b). 
 72 . See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 416 (2017), 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/271339.pdf [https://perma.cc/MXY7-
PXUC]. 
 73. Forty million people were victims of modern slavery in the world in 2017. 
See ALLIANCE 8.7, supra note 4, at 5. 
 74. Id. at 24. 
 75. Id. at 39. 
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Moreover, these same governments identified only 14,897 
prosecutions.77 
Similar trends exist in the United States. The Department of 
Justice only initiated a total of 241 federal human trafficking 
prosecutions in 2016, a decrease from 257 in 2015.78 It charged 
531 defendants, an increase from 377 the year before, and se-
cured convictions against 439 traffickers, a significant increase 
from 297 convictions in 2015.79 While these statistics suggest 
some improvement, there can be no dispute that these federal 
prosecutions in no way capture all the victims being sold into 
sex trafficking each day. 
Although likely many reasons exist for this increase in sex 
trafficking, including simply an increased awareness of the 
crime, there is little doubt that much of this increase is due to 
the ease of selling children and adult victims of sex trafficking 
online. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Chil-
dren (NCMEC) studied its reports of suspected child sex traf-
ficking over a five-year period and found an 846% increase in 
reports of suspected child sex trafficking online.80 NCMEC re-
ceives an average of 9,000–10,000 CyberTipline reports relating 
to child sex trafficking each year.81 Of those, 81% relate to child 
sex trafficking online.82 This crime often targets the most vul-
nerable in our society. A study of homeless children found that 
nearly one in five have been the victims of human trafficking.83 
This corroborates NCMEC’s reporting that one in six runaways 
                                                                                                                               
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Human Trafficking Investigation: Hearing Before the S. Permanent Subcomm. on 
Investigations, 114th Cong. 38–47 (2015) (statement of Yiota G. Souras, Senior Vice 
President and General Counsel, The National Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children). 
 81. See Hearing on S. 1693, supra note 7 (statement of Yiota G. Souras, Senior Vice 
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 83. See LAURA T. MURPHY, LOYOLA UNIV. NEW ORLEANS, LABOR AND SEX TRAF-
FICKING AMONG HOMELESS YOUTH: A TEN-CITY STUDY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 
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reported to NCMEC were likely victims of sex trafficking.84 
These increasing trends of child sex trafficking seem to corre-
late with the increased use of the Internet to sell children. Of 
reports received by NCMEC to the CyberTipline from mem-
bers of the public regarding suspected child sex trafficking, 
73% related to ads on Backpage.85 A Thorn study observed that 
75% of sex-trafficking victims interviewed were advertised 
online.86 California Attorney General Xavier Becerra testified 
before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation that almost every sex-trafficking case in his of-
fice involves online marketing.87 The consequence of this is sig-
nificant, as online advertising is associated with an increase in 
the number of buyers per victim.88 
These numbers are supported by common sense experience 
in the business community. Successful businesses move online 
where they can access potential buyers quickly and at low cost. 
What the Internet economy has done for legitimate business, it 
has done exponentially for illicit businesses; it provides all the 
benefits of an online presence with the additional layer of ano-
nymity. It is not surprising that these businesses have migrated 
to the Internet, because sex trafficking is not only a crime but 
also a highly lucrative business. As such, sex trafficking thrives 
in the ecosystem the Internet creates: low-cost, low-risk, and 
                                                                                                                               
 84. See NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, CHILD SEX TRAFFICK-
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 88. BOUCHÉ, TECHNOLOGY IN DMST, supra note 86, at 41. 
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high-profit.89 Legal online advertising platforms provide traf-
fickers and purchasers a highly convenient forum with limited 
public exposure.90 
III. SECTION 230 HAS THWARTED THE CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
TO COMBAT HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
One of the reasons sex trafficking has continued to grow, de-
spite comprehensive legislative efforts to combat it, has been 
the growing use of the Internet to facilitate it through online 
advertising. 91 Online advertising has been allowed to thrive 
due to both the case law that has emerged regarding § 230 and 
congressional inaction. 
While headlines focus on Craigslist and Backpage, many 
other sites are eager to partner with sex traffickers to obtain a 
share of the multibillion-dollar industry. 92 These include Es-
cortAds.xxx, Erosads.com, EroticMugShots.com, among oth-
ers.93 The impunity for facilitating sex trafficking that the Inter-
net offers goes beyond advertising to include so called “hobby 
boards,” where purchasers rate prostituted people and victims 
of trafficking as they would rate a restaurant on Yelp— except 
with graphic, vulgar, and violent detail.94 The misinterpretation 
of the protections of § 230 and congressional inaction led to a 
stalemate. Congress’ noble and clear vision to combat online 
sex trafficking continues to be unrealized and traffickers con-
tinue to advertise, buy, and sell victims with impunity. It is 
important to examine how § 230 was turned on its head and 
how this section of the CDA, designed to help shield children 
from explicit material, has been distorted to allow companies to 
facilitate children becoming the explicit material. 
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A. Courts Distorted § 230 and Created a Regime of De Facto 
Absolute Immunity, Contrary to Congressional Intent. 
While the intent of limited protections for limited actions 
was clear, since 1996 courts have interpreted § 230 significantly 
more broadly than the authors intended or than the words of 
the statute suggest. 95 Of the several hundred § 230 decisions in 
state and federal court since 1996, the vast majority have found 
websites immune from liability for events occurring on them.96 
Courts “have treated the relevant statutory language as creat-
ing a broad exemption from liability even when the substantive 
facts underlying a plaintiff’s claim are compelling.”97 
This state of affairs has real consequences for victims when 
the cases include sex trafficking. Additionally, it implicates 
other offenses such as stalking and nonconsensual pornogra-
phy, which also occur online, sometimes due to the operators 
of websites.98 Demonstrating that the defendant computer ser-
vice is a “bad actor” does not provide for liability.99 This “over-
broad interpretation has left victims of online abuse with no 
leverage against site operators whose business models facilitate 
abuse.”100 As Professor Citron and Mr. Wittes note, “Section 
230 of the CDA was by no means meant to immunize services 
whose business is the active subversion of online decency—
businesses that are not merely failing to take ‘Good Samaritan’ 
steps to protect users from online indecency but are actually 
being Bad Samaritans.”101 
                                                                                                                               
 95. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 35, at 408 (“The broad construction of the 
CDA’s immunity provision adopted by the courts has produced an immunity 
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To understand how the case law developed in the manner it 
did, one must first comprehend the state of the Internet at the 
time of the early decisions. In 1997, when cases first percolated 
through the court system, the Internet was in its infancy. The 
need to protect it as an unregulated bastion of freedom ap-
peared more pressing. Not only could courts not imagine the 
Internet of today, but they also did not envision the exploita-
tion today’s Internet fuels through the three A’s: anonymity, 
access, and affordability. 102 More specifically, they could not 
imagine the level of human trafficking occurring online. 
1. Early CDA Non-Sex Trafficking Cases 
The initial cases did not involve sex trafficking, as it was an 
unrecognized form of victimization. Hence, the relevant base-
line for jurisprudence was from a series of cases having noth-
ing to do with either the typical sex-trafficking scenario or the 
scope of the problem. 
Zeran v. America Online, Inc.103 is one of the earliest cases to 
address § 230, and it began a string of broad interpretations. In 
this defamation case, the plaintiff argued that AOL unreasona-
bly delayed the removal of defamatory messages, refused to 
issue a retraction, and failed to remove similar repeated 
posts.104 This 1997 case focused on the legislative history calling 
for unfettered free speech on the Internet, but it ignored the 
language of the statute.105 In granting AOL’s motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings, the Fourth Circuit concluded that § 230 
barred any cause of action that would make “service providers 
liable for information originating with a third-party user.”106 
The court based its decision on a desire to incentivize compa-
nies to self-regulate. It assumed that ruling the opposite way 
would expose service providers to liability if they knew of de-
famatory messages on their space, and that this, in turn, would 
incentivize them to be willfully ignorant and to cease policing 
                                                                                                                               
 102. See Al Cooper, Sexuality and the Internet: Surfing into the New Millennium, 1 
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 187, 187–93 (1998). 
 103. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 104. Id. at 328. 
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their space.107 Because this was a defamation case, there was no 
need to balance these concerns with the CDA’s other pur-
pose—to limit explicit content. The court’s failure to discuss 
this other goal created fertile ground for courts to maintain a 
singular focus on only one of § 230’s two purposes. 
Additionally, the court adopted a broad definition of pub-
lisher, finding the plaintiff’s claims treated AOL as a publisher: 
“[L]awsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its ex-
ercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as 
deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter con-
tent—are barred.”108 The court further rejected the characteriza-
tion of AOL as a distributor.109 
Another important early case was Doe v. America Online, 
Inc.,110 a Florida civil case in which the plaintiff accused AOL of 
knowingly distributing and allowing advertisements for child 
pornography, negligence, and a failure to respond to notifica-
tion that its services were being utilized to distribute obscene 
material. Here, the plaintiff argued that AOL was not a pub-
lisher, but a distributor. The Florida court rejected that argu-
ment, extending Zeran’s argument that websites are not dis-
tributors.111 
Doe v. America Online is important for what it did not say as 
much as for what it did say. Although the case involved allega-
tions regarding child pornography, it did not rely heavily on 
the purposes of § 230 consistent with those priorities— such as 
protecting children from explicit material and exploitation. In-
stead, the court quoted Zeran heavily, and in so doing it helped 
perpetuate a broad definition of publisher and suggested that 
Congress favored freedom of the Internet above all other goals. 
Importantly, the Florida appellate court in Doe v. America 
Online also found that § 230 preempted state law civil claims.112 
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Over the next decade, case law was built on this idea of 
broad immunity, derived frequently from defamation cases.113 
At the same time, the Internet was growing in strength, and 
explicit material was proliferating online. Not until 2008 did a 
published appellate opinion offer some reference to a limited 
immunity and hope for crime victims. In Fair Housing Council of 
San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com,114 the plaintiffs sought to 
establish that Roommates.com was actually a content provider 
and, as such, could be held liable for questions asked that vio-
lated housing discrimination regulations. As a basis for this 
claim, plaintiffs noted that Roommates.com provided its users 
with a drop-down menu that users had to answer to access the 
service. According to the plaintiffs, this action required users to 
enter certain discriminatory information such as preferences 
for roommates of certain races or sexual orientations. As such, 
Roommates.com was a content provider.115 The court agreed. 
Roommates provided some important additions to the juris-
prudence. First, holding that Roommates.com was a content 
provider made it one of the few cases to find potential liability 
for a website. In so doing it recognized a website could be both 
an interactive computer service as well as a content provider, at 
least where the website helped to develop the information:116 
If [a website] passively displays content that is created en-
tirely by third parties, then it is only a service provider with 
respect to that content. But as to content that it creates itself, 
or is “responsible, in whole or in part” for creating or devel-
oping, the website is also a content provider.117 
By focusing on the text of § 230, Roommates recognized that 
defendants were responsible “in part” for each profile on their 
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abused his wife); Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) 
(defamation). But see Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2001) (defend-
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website even if the content was a collaborative effort between 
the website and the user.118 The Ninth Circuit also clarified the 
term “development” to include not merely augmenting the 
content generally but “materially contributing to its alleged 
unlawfulness.”119 
Critically, Roommates also distinguished the typical content 
provider from the concerns in Prodigy. It noted that Prodigy 
was sued for removing some, but not enough, material from its 
sites. “Here Roommate is not being sued for removing some 
harmful messages while failing to remove others.”120 Rather, it 
was being sued for causing illegal material to be displayed. The 
recognition of potential liability was not without limits: “The 
message to website operators is clear: if you don’t encourage 
illegal content . . . you will be immune.”121 
While the early cases set the tone for this jurisprudence, a 
few, such as Roommates, were open to recognizing limitations. 
Importantly, the Roommates court understood the need to up-
date legal reactions to problems. Specifically, it rejected to some 
extent the knee-jerk argument that § 230 immunity was neces-
sary to buoy a fragile Internet: 
The Internet is no longer a fragile new means of communica-
tion that could easily be smothered in the cradle by over-
zealous enforcement of laws and regulations applicable to 
brick-and-mortar businesses. . . . [W]e must be careful not to 
exceed the scope of the immunity provided by Congress and 
thus give online businesses an unfair advantage over their 
real-world counterparts, which must comply with laws of 
general applicability.122 
Therefore, Roommates offered an alternative path interpreting 
§ 230 more in line with the text and original purpose of the 
CDA. However, when courts considered the sex-trafficking 
cases, they rejected that textual approach. 
                                                                                                                               
 118. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1166. 
 119. Id. at 1167–68. Even “encouraging” unlawful content may be enough to lose 
§ 230 protection. See id. at 1171. 
 120. Id. at 1170. 
 121. Id. at 1175. 
 122. Id. at 1164 n.15. 
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2. Websites Block Civil Cases 
By 2009, online advertising of sex trafficking was rampant, 
and it had transcended its earlier status as a nuisance. Internet 
advertisements allowed human traffickers to quickly sell vic-
tims to sex buyers in multiple cities.123 The websites successful-
ly argued that the early cases, which were decided before the 
advent of online sex trafficking, protected them from any liabil-
ity. They argued that they were entitled to “broad[] im-
muni[ty]” for disseminating third-party content.124 
Frustrated with his inability to contain sex trafficking, Cook 
County Sheriff Thomas Dart sued a popular platform for such 
advertisements, Craigstlist.com. His federal suit alleged a 
common law claim of public nuisance, utilizing as evidence 
Craigslist’s violation of local prostitution laws.125 The District 
Court dismissed this diversity jurisdiction suit for a number of 
reasons. In so doing, the court reframed Dart’s argument, find-
ing that he more accurately presented a “negligent publishing” 
claim, which § 230 precludes when it “derives from the de-
fendant’s status or conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker.’”126 
In dismissing this cause of action, the trial court accepted the 
allegation that traffickers routinely flouted Craigslist’s guide-
lines and terms of use.127 However, the court refused to allow 
the case to proceed and granted the motion for judgment on 
the pleadings. 128 Unlike in Roommates, where the defendants 
were responsible for the content and caused the illegal activi-
ty,129 the court here found the defendants did not do so and, 
                                                                                                                               
 123. See Hearing on S. 1693, supra note 7 (testimony of Yiota G. Souras, Senior 
Vice President and General Counsel, The National Center for Missing and Ex-
ploited Children). 
 124. See, e.g., Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 965 (N.D. Ill. 2009) 
(quoting Craigslist’s assertion that § 230(c)(1) “broadly immunizes providers of 
interactive computer services from liability for the dissemination of third-party 
content.”). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 967–98. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. at 970. 
 129. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 
1157 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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therefore, could not be deemed responsible in whole or in part 
for the content of the ads.130 
A different approach was taken in federal court by a survivor 
of sex trafficking. As a fourteen-year-old runaway girl, M.A. 
was sexually trafficked.131 M.A.’s trafficker admitted to taking 
pornographic photographs of her, displaying her private body 
parts, and posting them on Backpage as advertisements to sell 
her for sexual services.132 Backpage profited from these adver-
tisements.133 
M.A. sued Village Voice Media, the then-owners of Back-
page, in federal court under the private right of action provid-
ed for victims of child pornography and sex trafficking.134 She 
alleged, inter alia, that Backpage aided and abetted her traffick-
er in violating the child sex-trafficking laws, child pornography 
laws, and U.S. treaty obligations under the Optional Protocol of 
the Convention of the Rights of the Child Against the Sale of 
Children.135 
M.A. attempted to distinguish her claims from previous 
plaintiffs’ efforts to hold interactive computer services liable. 
She did not base her allegations on the content of the adver-
tisements, but instead concentrated on the website’s role as a 
sex-trafficking facilitator.136 She focused on Backpage’s conduct 
in developing and posting the advertisements, instructing the 
trafficker on how to increase the impact of posted ads, and of-
fering special ad placement.137 The court accepted Roommates’ 
holding that a website operator can be both a content provider 
and a service provider, and it found Backpage immune from 
liability.138 
This early sex-trafficking opinion refers back to the late 
1990s’ “broad immunity” language—a product of a time before 
                                                                                                                               
 130. See Dart, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 969. 
 131. M.A. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1043 (E.D. Mo. 
2011). 
 132. Id. at 1043, 1045. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012). 
 135. M.A., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1045. 
 136. See id. at 1044–45. 
 137. Id. at 1044, 1048. 
 138. Id. at 1059. 
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the modern Internet, the conceptualization of human traffick-
ing, and the unforeseen explosion of online sex trafficking.139 
Repeatedly citing to defamation cases,140 which are clearly dis-
tinguishable from child trafficking cases, the court concluded 
that Congress chose a policy of “broad immunity” in all § 230 
cases.141 The court recognized the inherent conflict in cases in-
volving § 230 immunity and cases where individuals are direct-
ly harmed, noting that “[t]he legislative resolution of these is-
sues will, indirectly, shape the content of communication over 
the Internet. For now . . . § 230 of the [CDA] errs on the side of 
robust communication, and prevents the plaintiffs from mov-
ing forward with their claims.”142 The court, relying on the ear-
ly cases that did not deal with sex trafficking, asserted that 
Congress created a policy giving content providers near-
absolute immunity.143 
The tone of this decision reflects the struggle of courts in try-
ing to reconcile two separate congressional purposes. On the 
one hand, courts are trying to be attentive to § 230’s purpose. 
Congress clearly listed its dual purposes in § 230(a), and one of 
those purposes involves the protection of children.144 Unfortu-
nately, many early cases did not have to address child protec-
tion and only referred to the other purpose of § 230.145 These 
cases mischaracterized the congressional purpose as one fo-
cused primarily on the goal of a free and unfettered Internet; 
the equally significant goal of protecting children and preclud-
ing the dissemination of explicit material was often ignored. As 
such, courts created an impression that the immunity provided 
was broader than intended and existed for only one purpose. 
On the other hand, courts must reconcile this with Congress’s 
unmistakable intent to combat sex trafficking, which it has 
demonstrated by authorizing civil enforcement actions and 
criminal laws that target sex traffickers. Congress intended to 
                                                                                                                               
 139. See id. at 1051. 
 140. See id. at 1053. 
 141. See id. at 1051. 
 142. Id. at 1053 (alteration in original) (quoting PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko’s 
Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1071–72 (D. S.D. 2001)). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a) (2012). 
 145. See id. 
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disrupt the sex-trafficking business model at many different 
pressure points. 
Unfortunately, when courts adjudicating sex-trafficking cas-
es look to precedent for guidance, they inevitably find the older 
cases, which emphasize not the plain language of the statute 
but only a portion of the statute’s findings. M.A. v. Village Voice 
Media Holdings 146  exemplifies this struggle. There, the court 
acknowledged M.A.’s characterization of immunity for a web-
site “that solicits and facilitates illegal conduct” as “indefensi-
ble.”147 However, the opinion follows with the sentiment, “re-
gardless of M.A.’s characterization of the policy choice of 
denying § 230 immunity in such circumstances as alleged as 
‘clear,’ it nonetheless is a matter Congress has spoken on and is 
for Congress, not this Court, to revisit.”148 The opinion closes 
with the court underscoring this point and suggesting a frus-
tration with reconciling these two pieces of legislation: “Con-
gress has declared such websites to be immune from suits aris-
ing from such injuries. It is for Congress to change the policy 
that gave rise to such immunity.”149 
Of course the problem with this analysis is that it is far from 
clear that Congress declared such websites to be immune from 
liability. Indeed, the word “immunity” is nowhere to be found 
in the statute.150 The statute was designed to limit access to ex-
plicit material, not enable a website to successfully claim im-
munity when such an image appears on its platform and facili-
tates the actual trafficking of the person depicted. Yet, due to 
the language of early precedents from a different time regard-
ing a different type of situation—murky defamation as op-
posed to clear child sex trafficking—the M.A. court adopted 
Backpage’s argument that websites are immune even when fa-
cilitating sex trafficking.151 
                                                                                                                               
 146. 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1043 (E.D. Mo. 2011). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 1053. 
 149. Id. at 1058. 
 150. See J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 359 P.3d 714, 718 (Wash. 2015) 
(en banc) (Wiggins, J., concurring). 
 151. M.A., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1058. 
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It is essential to note that this case, like all those that courts 
dismissed, was dismissed pretrial on immunity grounds. 152 
That is to say, survivors as plaintiffs were denied an ability to 
get through the courthouse door. Importantly, they were also 
denied discovery to access the documents that would have 
demonstrated the extent to which these websites facilitated sex 
trafficking. 
3. Backpage Blocks State Regulation 
Having failed to successfully assert state law claims to im-
pede online advertising of sex-trafficking victims for sale in 
Dart v. Craigslist, Inc.,153 and then federal civil claims in M.A., 
states and victims found their hands tied. In the wake of these 
thwarted efforts, a legally protected public market to buy and 
sell sex-trafficking victims arose. States next attempted to pass 
new laws prohibiting this business practice. The response from 
one online advertising company was swift and aggressive. At 
the time, Backpage was the second largest online advertising 
platform in the United States. Its revenue was estimated to be 
$150 million dollars with much of that deriving from online 
“adult” advertisements.154 And in M.A., Backpage had success-
fully argued that it possessed broad immunity to advertise 
online for the sale of sex-trafficking victims under § 230. 
In an effort to oppose open marketplaces where children 
were bought for sex, Washington, Tennessee, and New Jersey 
all passed legislation targeting online advertisements for pros-
tituted persons as well as victims of sex trafficking.155 The ob-
jective of these laws was to end the large marketplaces for 
online sex trafficking. These laws resulted from states’ growing 
frustration with their inability to combat this problem. For ex-
ample, in Backpage.com v. McKenna,156 Washington police identi-
fied a minor victim whose images repeatedly appeared in 
                                                                                                                               
 152. Id. at 1059. 
 153. 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967–68 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 154. See 163 CONG. REC. S3977 (daily ed. July 13, 2017) (statement of Sen. Port-
man). 
 155. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-10(b)(1) (West 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
314 (WEST 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.101 (West 2017). 
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Backpage’s advertisements even after they notified the site.157 
Backpage initially removed the images but they continued to 
reappear. 158  The seemingly never-ending ability to advertise 
the same victim spurred these legislative responses. 
Backpage successfully enjoined all of these laws from being 
enforced. Courts found that § 230(e)(3) expressly preempted 
state laws that were inconsistent with the immunity found 
therein.159 Given that one of the purposes of the CDA is to pro-
tect children from exposure to explicit materials,160 one could 
argue these laws were not inconsistent with the Act. However, 
McKenna found the criminalization of the knowing publishing 
or displaying of such ads was inconsistent with the CDA, be-
cause such criminalization incentivized service providers to not 
monitor the content that goes through their channels.161 
This holding is mistaken. The CDA was clearly enacted to 
protect from liability an ISP who monitors for explicit material, 
but in good faith fails to capture everything, as the defendant 
did in Prodigy. 162 The CDA was not intended to protect the 
company that monitors, discovers illegal content, profits from 
it, and allows it to spread on its platform.163 
The CDA made this original distinction in the policy section 
of § 230.164 However, by the time of these three cases, Backpage 
and the courts heavily relied upon the early CDA cases that did 
not involve trafficking. McKenna accurately noted that a “ma-
jority of federal circuits have interpreted [§ 230] to establish 
broad federal immunity to any cause of action that would make 
service providers liable for information originating with a third-
                                                                                                                               
 157. Id. at 1267–68. 
 158. Id. at 1268. 
 159. See Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805, 823 (M.D. Tenn. 
2013); Backpage.com, LLC v. Hoffman, No. 13-cv-03952, 2013 WL 4502097, at *18 
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party user of the services.”165 While statistically accurate, the 
assertion of such a broad rule was inconsistent with the intent 
of the limited protections of the CDA. 
Although the constitutionality of these state laws is beyond 
the scope of this article, the CDA basis for the opinions illus-
trates its misconstruction. For example in Backpage.com v. 
Cooper, 166  apparently emboldened by the de facto immunity 
created for these companies in the online advertising arena, 
Backpage argued even further that the statute “is preempted by 
the CDA because § 230 of the CDA prohibits state laws from 
imposing liability on interactive computer services for third-
party content, even if the content is unlawful and the website had 
reason to know of the unlawfulness.”167 Such a position is ironic to 
say the least. These actors utilized the Good Samaritan provi-
sion of the section of the CDA entitled “Protection for Private 
Blocking and Screening or Offensive Material” to claim im-
munity for knowingly providing access to unlawful material.168 
Unfortunately, the courts allowed this distortion.169 
4. Websites Block Efforts to Disrupt the Business Model of 
Advertising Sex-Trafficking Victims for Sale 
By 2015, the use of online advertisements to sell human traf-
ficking victims, particularly child sex-trafficking victims, was 
expansive and significant. NCMEC found the increase in re-
ports of child sex trafficking “directly correlated to the in-
creased use of the Internet to sell children for sex.”170 An Urban 
                                                                                                                               
 165. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1273 (citing Barnes v. Yahoo!, 570 F.3d 1096, 
1101–02 (9th Cir. 2009)) (first emphasis added). 
 166. Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805 (M.D. Tenn. 2013). 
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Institute study of eight U.S. cities found that the market for 
commercial sex and the trafficking of children within it had 
expanded as a result of the Internet’s rise as a new venue to 
buy and sell women and children for sex.171 Similarly, the De-
partment of Justice found that there was an increase in the 
profitability of sex trafficking of children through the Internet, 
making it a more attractive venue for sex traffickers.172 
Notwithstanding the undeniable growth in online adver-
tisements and its significant role in increasing sex trafficking, 
courts continued to deny these aforementioned efforts to civilly 
sue these companies. As discussed above, courts also rejected 
state-level legislative approaches. In fact, in 2013, forty-nine 
state attorneys general wrote to Congress demanding that it 
amend § 230 back to its original limited protection and allow 
states to enforce their own criminal laws: 
The involvement of these advertising companies is not inci-
dental—these companies have constructed their business 
models around income gained from participants in the sex 
trade. But, as it has most recently been interpreted, the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”) prevents 
State and local law enforcement agencies from prosecuting 
these companies. This must change. The undersigned Attor-
neys General respectfully request that the U.S. Congress 
amend the CDA so that it restores to State and local authori-
ties their traditional jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute 
those who promote prostitution and endanger our chil-
dren.173 
                                                                                                                               
 171. DANK, supra note 5, at 237–38; BOUCHÉ, TECHNOLOGY IN DMST, supra note 
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They, like so many others, recognized Backpage as the leading 
platform for these advertisements. Congress did not act on 
these requests. 
With their hands tied, members of local legislatures and law 
enforcement experienced growing frustration regarding their 
inability to address these problems and enforce state anti-
trafficking laws that have been recognized by the federal gov-
ernment as the primary legal weapon against sex trafficking.174 
Unable to sue civilly or utilize state laws, Sheriff Tom Dart took 
efforts to pressure different aspects of the business model. 
On June 29, 2015, Dart sent a letter on official stationary to 
the Chief Executive Officers of MasterCard and Visa asking 
these companies to “immediately cease and desist” allowing 
their credit cards to process payments regarding Backpage.175 
Dart claimed he embarked on this campaign to stop the human 
trafficking facilitated in Backpage’s “adult” section. 176  Back-
page responded with litigation, seeking a preliminary injunc-
tion against Dart.177 Although the district court denied Back-
page’s motion,178 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
reversed.179 The Circuit Court found that Sheriff Dart, “in his 
public capacity,” cannot “issue and publicize dire threats 
against credit card companies that process payments made 
through Backpage’s website, including threats of prosecu-
tion . . . in an effort to throttle Backpage.”180 Although Visa filed 
an affidavit stating it did not feel threatened by Dart’s letter, 
the Court noted that a letter from a government official in his 
official capacity that, in its view, contained legal threats, was 
coercive.181 
While the holding of the opinion is not surprising, the full-
throated support for Backpage is worthy of note. Not only did 
Judge Posner characterize Dart’s actions as an effort to “throttle 
                                                                                                                               
 174. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 72, at 389. 
 175. Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229, 231 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 176. Id. at 230. 
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Backpage.com,”182 he also stated that “it is unclear that Back-
page is engaged in illegal activity.”183 This is a point that was 
disputed by forty-nine state attorneys general and seemingly 
rejected in M.A. despite that court’s interpretation of § 230 im-
munity as broad enough to cover illegal activity.184 As will be 
discussed below, this seems to no longer be an open question. 
However, without being able to reach discovery, litigants have 
not been able to solidify their claims. 
5. State Civil Litigation Outside the Scope of § 230 
Having been blocked on every front in their attempts to hold 
online advertisers accountable for advertising children and 
human trafficking victims for sale, victims and state attorneys 
general found themselves unable to proceed past motions to 
dismiss to even get to the discovery that would substantiate 
their claims. Not only had efforts to sue in federal court failed, 
but also efforts to pass state laws had been stopped through 
litigation from the online advertisers, and efforts to disrupt the 
business model were enjoined. Plaintiffs then turned to state 
law claims for allegations based on state torts and not the 
online advertisments. 
In Washington, one case, J.S. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, 
LLC,185 survived a motion to dismiss and was allowed to pro-
ceed to discovery on track for trial. The reasons for this success 
are many. While the holding is an important departure from 
the previous jurisprudence, the analysis of the concurring opin-
ion is perhaps more significant. 
Plaintiffs, all minors, were advertised and sold for sex on 
Backpage and alleged in their lawsuit that Backpage knowingly 
helped their traffickers. Baruti Hopson prostituted J.S. and was 
convicted of rape, assault, and prostitution.186 Plaintiffs alleged 
numerous state law claims including “negligence, outrage, 
sexual exploitation of children, ratification/vicarious liability, 
unjust enrichment, invasion of privacy, sexual assault and bat-
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tery, and civil conspiracy.”187 Backpage moved to dismiss the 
case, offering its traditional argument that § 230 provided it 
with such broad immunity that even if the plaintiffs were alleg-
ing acts beyond publishing third-party content, it would still be 
immune from liability. 188 Plaintiffs responded that Backpage 
received no immunity because its actions involved not simply 
publishing but also developing rules that were “designed to 
help pimps develop advertisements that can evade the un-
wanted attention of law enforcement, while still conveying the 
illegal message.”189 The case survived a motion to dismiss on 
the trial level and the defendant moved for discretionary re-
view by the Washington State Supreme Court. This Court held 
that the plaintiffs pleaded a case that survived the motion to 
dismiss and affirmed the trial court’s ruling.190 
Before analyzing the reasoning of the Washington Supreme 
Court, it is important to note that the case benefited from two 
distinctions from previous cases. First, the standard for a 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in Washington is very high. As the 
state high court noted, “12(b)(6) motions should be granted 
‘sparingly and with care’ and ‘only in the unusual case in 
which plaintiff includes allegations that show on the face of the 
complaint that there is some insuperable bar to relief.’”191 Fur-
thermore, the court noted that “[d]ismissal under CR 12(b)(6) is 
appropriate only if ‘it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that 
no facts exist that would justify recovery.’”192 
In applying this standard, the majority concluded that the 
claims were permissible. The majority recognized that § 230(e) 
precluded state causes of action inconsistent with the CDA. 
Noting that the CDA allows litigation against content provid-
ers, the majority identified the issue as whether the allegations 
treated Backpage as an information content provider that was 
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subject to state law liability.193 Recognizing Roommates’ conclu-
sion that a website can be both a content provider and an inter-
active computer service, the majority concluded that many of 
the claims “alleged facts that, if proved true, would show that 
Backpage did more than simply maintain neutral policies pro-
hibiting or limiting certain content.”194 The claims included al-
legations that Backpage developed content that is designed to 
allow pimps to traffic underage girls and evade law enforce-
ment, that its posting rules are a fraud aimed to assist evading 
law enforcement, and that the content requirements are de-
signed to allow pimps to traffic in sex to Backpage’s profit.195 
As such, the majority found these allegations were consistent 
with Roommates’ standard of contributing materially to illegali-
ty of the conduct, and thus survived a motion to dismiss. 
While this majority holding is important, as it was the first 
court to allow a state claim to reach discovery, the more in-
sightful aspect of the opinion arguably arose from the concur-
rence. The majority appeared to largely accept the conventional 
framework of § 230 but did not blindly follow these precedents 
when not on point with present sex-trafficking cases. Justice 
McCloud, writing in dissent, accepted the conventional view 
that § 230 provided broad immunity for Backpage even if these 
allegations were of illegal activity.196 
Justice Wiggins, writing in concurrence, fully supported the 
majority approach but wrote separately to clarify that plain-
tiffs’ claims did not treat Backpage as a publisher or speaker 
and to vehemently reject Backpage and the dissent’s view that 
§ 230 provides immunity to such defendants.197 The crux of his 
opinion states: 
Subsection 230(c)(1) instead provides a narrower protection 
from liability: the plain language of the statute creates a de-
fense when there is (1) a provider or user of an interactive 
computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a 
state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker of infor-
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mation (3) that is provided by another information content 
provider. 
Thus, when the cause of action does not treat an intermedi-
ary as a publisher or speaker, subsection 230(c)(1) cannot be 
read to protect that intermediary from liability.198 
For the first time in a sex-trafficking case, a judge did not 
blindly accept an online advertiser’s claim of unbounded im-
munity, even for actions that are possibly criminal or outside 
the role of publisher. In so doing, Justice Wiggins first turned 
to the plain language of the statute, observing it does not rec-
ognize any immunity—even a limited one. He noted that the 
protections afforded interactive computer services are twofold. 
First, § 230(c)(1) “precludes treating an interactive computer 
service provider as publisher or speaker of information provid-
ed by another provider.” 199 Second, § 230(c)(2) provides that 
such a service provider cannot be liable for good faith action to 
restrict access to objectionable material or any action making 
available the technical means to restrict such access.200 There-
fore, as long as a plaintiff does not treat the defendant as a pub-
lisher or a speaker, he can proceed with a cause of action. 
Justice Wiggins even challenged the notion that such narrow 
statutory language created any form of immunity at all: 
“Backpage.com’s argument that section 230 ‘provides broad 
immunity to online service providers’ is wholly unsupported 
by the statute’s plain language—subsection 230(c) says nothing 
about ‘broad immunity.’”201 In addition to invoking the plain 
language of § 230, Justice Wiggins also relied on the context in 
which it was passed. In so doing, Justice Wiggins resurrected 
the procedural history regarding protection of children long 
ignored. The concurrence went on to note: 
The main purpose of subsection 230(c) is not to insulate pro-
viders from civil liability for objectionable content on their 
websites, but to protect providers from civil liability for lim-
iting access to objectionable content. Ironically, the dissent 
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would turn section 230 upside down, insulating plaintiffs 
from expanding access to objectionable content.202 
Indeed, some of the legislative history characterizes § 230 as 
a provision that “allows an on-line service to defend itself in 
court by showing a good-faith effort to lock out adult materi-
al.”203 
Turning to the efforts by Backpage in this litigation, as well 
as those of Craigslist and Village Voice, Justice Wiggins noted 
the perversity of using § 230 to justify Backpage’s actions: “[I]t 
would be absurd to ignore [the language about good faith in 
230(c)(2)] in order to protect the actions of Backpage.com, taken 
in bad faith, that have nothing to do with publishing or speak-
ing another’s content.”204 Justice Wiggins stripped down the 
defendant’s argument and labeled it what Backpage was in fact 
demanding: absolute immunity. He correctly noted that the 
reading advocated by Backpage “would absolutely immunize 
providers who allow third parties freedom to post objectiona-
ble materials on the providers’ websites.”205 
Justice Wiggins’ concurrence reveals Backpage’s claims for 
what they are: claims of absolute immunity from civil or state-
law liability arising from a statute whose language and context 
do not indicate such an intent. But perhaps even more im-
portantly, Justice Wiggins’ concurrence also chastises other 
courts for relying on the early § 230 cases to create de facto 
immunity.206 The concurrence noted that even the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals had “retreated” from its early language of 
broad immunity to finding that no “general immunity” is pre-
sent in the text’s language.207 
J.S. is the only published case to have survived a motion to 
dismiss and to have been upheld by an appellate court.208 It 
                                                                                                                               
 202. Id. at 720. 
 203. 141 CONG. REC. 15,106 (1995). 
 204. J.S., 359 P.3d at 720. 
 205. Id. (emphasis added). 
 206. Id. at 721. 
 207. See id. at 721 (citing Barnes v. Yahoo!, 570 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 208. As of this writing, a pending case in an Alabama state circuit court has 
denied a motion to dismiss without issuing an opinion and Backpage is appeal-
ing. See K.R. v. Backpage.com, LLC, No. 38-cv-17-900041 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 2017). A 
U.S. District Court in Florida has denied Backpage’s motion to stay discovery 
 
592 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 41 
 
was scheduled for trial in October 2017. However, after Senate 
subcommittee hearings on the CDA and on the night before a 
House Judiciary Committee hearing on the CDA, Backpage set-
tled the case.209 
6. Federal Sex Trafficking Civil Cases 
Victims who had been similarly trafficked through the use of 
Backpage filed a federal lawsuit in the District of Massachu-
setts that was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit.210 Despite Congress’s clear intent in 18 U.S.C. § 1595 to 
allow victims to sue traffickers, the plaintiffs in this lawsuit did 
not fare as well as those in Washington state court. Three Jane 
Doe plaintiffs alleged that they were trafficked and advertised 
on Backpage, resulting in the three being raped over 1,900 
times in total. They sued, accusing Backpage of engaging in the 
trafficking of minors under 18 U.S.C. § 1591 and the parallel 
civil right of action in 18 U.S.C. § 1595. They also alleged the 
same claim under the Massachusetts Anti-Human Trafficking 
Victim Protection Act,211 violations of the Massachusetts Con-
sumer Protection Act,212 and some intellectual property claims 
regarding their images. The district court granted Backpage’s 
motion to dismiss.213 
On appeal, the First Circuit recognized that in the twenty-
first century, courts need to address not only the intent of Con-
gress in 1996 when it passed the CDA, but also the more recent 
intent of Congress when it passed the TVPRA, and the allow-
ance for a private right of action for victims.214 The plaintiffs’ 
complaint went beyond alleging that Backpage published in-
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appropriate advertisements; it also alleged that Backpage en-
gaged in a campaign to distract attention from its active role in 
sex trafficking. These actions included, among other things, 
making false statements to NCMEC and law enforcement re-
garding its efforts to fight sex trafficking while, in fact, deliber-
ately creating a website that facilitates sex trafficking.215 Back-
page allegedly did so by establishing payment structures 
through digital currency, stripping photographs uploaded in 
advertisements of metadata to prevent law enforcement dis-
covering its location of origin, only charging a fee to “adult en-
tertainment” advertisements, allowing traffickers to sponsor 
ads in the “escort” section of the platform, and similar ac-
tions.216 Despite these claims being directly tied to legal causes 
of action outside the role of publisher, the First Circuit found 
them precluded by § 230. 
Citing to the very early § 230 cases, the First Circuit adopted, 
without analysis, the preference “for broad construction” of the 
CDA.217 Indeed, the court characterized this liberal construction 
as resulting in “a capacious conception of what it means to 
treat a website operator as the publisher or speaker of infor-
mation provided by a third party.”218 With that broad interpre-
tation of the narrowly written CDA, the First Circuit then con-
cluded that the plaintiffs’ claims under the TVPA were, in fact, 
ones that treated Backpage as a publisher.219 
Even if that were the case, in determining congressional in-
tent, the First Circuit could have looked at the more recent 
pronouncement of congressional intent in the TVPA, which 
made sex trafficking a crime, prioritized prosecution, and pro-
vided victims the right to sue their traffickers and those who 
engage in a sex-trafficking enterprise with sex traffickers, and 
concluded that congressional intent was more recent and more 
clear with this legislation.220 However, citing back to the 1997 
Zeran case and a 2007 First Circuit case addressing a financial 
bulletin board, it rejected Justice Wiggins’ concurrence in J.S. in 
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a footnote and concluded that the alleged actions of Backpage 
were decisions of a publisher deciding what content to circu-
late and what to not.221 Regarding the existence of the TVPRA 
claims, the First Circuit made a stunning statement of absolute 
immunity: 
[E]ven if we assume, for argument’s sake, that Backpage’s 
conduct amounts to “participation in a [sex-trafficking] ven-
ture”—a phrase that no published opinion has yet interpret-
ed—the TVPRA claims as pleaded premise that participation 
on Backpage’s actions as a publisher or speaker of third-
party content. The strictures of Section 230(c) foreclose such 
suits.222 
Thus, the First Circuit expanded the concept of broad im-
munity from 1997 to include immunity for participating in a 
sex-trafficking venture. In so doing, it asserted that the basis of 
this immunity was a statute Congress enacted in part to protect 
children from exposure to explicit materials. No court has gone 
so far as to conclude that § 230 was designed for this form of 
absolute immunity—even for criminal sex trafficking. The re-
gime of de facto absolute immunity was firmly entrenched 
through this holding. 
The First Circuit did join the early M.A. case’s chorus to 
amend the CDA and clarify the tension between the TVPA and 
the CDA. In so doing, however, the court referenced only one 
of the purposes of the CDA, ignoring its purpose to protect 
children from exposure to explicit material, by stating: “If the 
evils that the appellants have identified are deemed to out-
weigh the First Amendment values that drive the CDA, the 
remedy is through legislation, not through litigation.”223 
7. State Criminal Law Efforts 
In the wake of these attempts to limit the sale of children 
online over the objection of the tech lobby, Congress passed the 
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SAVE Act which amended 18 U.S.C. § 1591 to include “adver-
tising” among the actus rei that encompassed sex trafficking.224 
As such, advertising a minor knowing she is a minor, to engage 
in a commercial sex act, as well as advertising a person one 
knows to be the victim of sex trafficking through force, fraud, 
or coercion is also illegal. Thus, federal prosecutors could pros-
ecute the pimps who place ads online as human traffickers, as 
well as the advertisers who know the victims are minors or 
adult victims of sex trafficking.225 Emboldened by its successful 
elimination of three state laws seeking to make advertising ille-
gal, Backpage sued the Department of Justice asserting a pre-
enforcement First Amendment challenge to the Act.226 Indeed, 
Backpage referenced those prior efforts in its filings attempting 
to assert standing. However, the District Court granted the 
government’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction because Backpage didn’t and couldn’t claim that it 
was engaging in a course of conduct that both affected a consti-
tutional interest and was proscribed by the SAVE Act or gave 
rise to a credible threat of prosecution.227 Notably, as of this 
writing, Backpage has not been charged under this section of 
the act. 
Having been unable to proceed against Backpage through 
federal civil law, state civil laws, federal criminal laws, and the 
creation of state criminal law, state attorneys general struggled 
to find a way to combat companies like Backpage. In 2016, the 
California Attorney General took action not against Backpage 
itself, but against its owners: Carl Ferrer, Michael Lacey, and 
James Larkin. California arrested and criminally charged these 
men initially with conspiracy to pimp, pimping, and pimping 
of a minor for their roles in running Backpage.228 California al-
leged that defendants created and organized a website that al-
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lows sex trafficking to take place “with the intent to derive 
support and maintenance” from the resulting prostitution, and 
that they derived that support from the advertisements they 
and others placed on EvilEmpire.com and BigCity.com.229 The 
defendants filed a demurrer, arguing that the CDA had such 
breadth of immunity that it even applied to state criminal 
charges of pimping. 
The Superior Court granted defendants’ demurrer, but its 
discussion of the case law on the topic and the need for Con-
gress to amend § 230 to reflect current times is instructive. First, 
the court recognized that the State had “a strong and legitimate 
interest in combating human trafficking by all available legal 
means. Moreover, any rational mind would concur that the 
selling of minors for the purpose of sex is particularly horrify-
ing and the government has a right and a duty to protect these 
most vulnerable victims.” 230 However, the court went on to 
note that this state interest can be overcome. Here, the court 
noted the origin of the CDA with the Prodigy case, and the real-
ity that several courts had interpreted it broadly.231 Tellingly, 
however, the court also noted, “Congress has had ample op-
portunity to statutorily modify the immunity provision if it 
disagrees with prevailing judicial application of this provision. 
Congress has not done so, and the current legal framework 
binds this Court.”232 
Having expressed this reservation regarding the case law 
and congressional inaction, the court examined the People’s 
arguments that the CDA did not protect the defendants when 
they knowingly committed those crimes. The prosecution fo-
cused on its allegation that the defendants were collecting in-
formation put onto Backpage by third parties, and repackaging 
it to create a kind of dating site on BigCity.com as well as a 
phone directory on EvilEmpire.com.233 The prosecution analo-
gized this to People v. Bollaert,234 in which the defendant was 
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convicted for creating a revenge pornography site where he 
encouraged people to post illegal information about others.235 
However, the court rejected this analogy, noting that Bollaert 
required the third parties to post illegal information that vio-
lated another’s privacy, but the defendants did not require 
such unlawful information.236 The court characterized this as 
simply reposting third-party information which was tradition-
ally a publishing function protected by the CDA.237 
Regarding the pimping charges, the court noted that the im-
munity of the CDA “has been extended by the courts to apply 
to functions traditionally associated with publishing decisions, 
such as accepting payment for services and editing.” 238  As 
such, the court found that the CDA as currently interpreted, 
protected the alleged action—as these charges were seeking to 
treat the defendants as publishers. It joined the First Circuit 
and the Middle District of Tennessee in asking Congress to 
clarify this conflict between the legitimate state interest to end 
sexual exploitation and congressional “foreclosure of prosecu-
tion” by stating, “Congress has spoken on this matter and it is 
for Congress, not this Court, to revisit.”239 
Not to be deterred, however, the State of California again 
sought criminal charges against these same defendants, this 
time alleging money laundering as well as pimping.240 Now, 
having twice had criminal allegations deemed to be protected 
by the CDA, the defendants argued that their immunity was 
“clear” and the charges were now in the category of “bad 
faith.”241 After rejecting the defendants’ arguments to reassign 
the case to the previous judge who dismissed the original con-
duct, the court addressed defendants’ claim that the First 
Amendment barred all charges. The court rejected this claim as 
to the money laundering charges, but accepted it as to the 
pimping charges, for many of the same reasons as the court 
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had done previously.242 However, the court also relied heavily 
on the Jane Doe holding from the First Circuit to afford broad 
immunity to the alleged criminal activity of the defendants.243 
B. Analysis of Case Law 
Over the two decades since the passage of the CDA and 
eighteen years since the passage of the first TVPA, three ques-
tions emerge. First, how did the jurisprudence arrive at a posi-
tion so diametrically opposed to the intent of these two pieces 
of legislation? Second, why has Congress failed to act to correct 
this problem? Third, what brought about and what is the sig-
nificance of recent congressional activity? 
1. Evolution of the Law 
The arc of this jurisprudence is of concern. A common de-
nominator through these years has been the strength of the tech 
industry in influencing congressional action and inaction. 
In 1996, Congress was primarily concerned with the poten-
tial exposure of children to explicit material. 244 This concern 
was prophetic, as the Internet has proven to be a bastion of 
pornography and its easy access to children is of real concern. 
Researcher Michael Seto has described the early and pervasive 
exposure to Internet pornography among children and youth 
as “the largest unregulated social experiment of all time,” 245 
and the effect this material is having on the juvenile brain is 
profound.246 Resistance from the tech industry to any sort of 
limit on such material was strong. 247 Additionally, Congress 
intended to permit the Internet to develop with little regula-
tion, in order for it to become a place of free speech. Conse-
quently, Congress created the CDA, but also added to it § 230 
to speak to these latter concerns. Specifically, in response to 
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Prodigy, Congress sought to protect companies that were good 
Samaritans from being held liable for trying to limit access to 
explicit material. 
Today the case law, with some exceptions, is anything but re-
flective of that purpose. Instead, a body of law has developed 
thwarting congressional intent. Not only are courts espousing 
“broad immunity” provided by the CDA, but they are even 
holding that websites that engage in criminal activity are im-
mune from liability. They have done so notwithstanding that 
immunity is nowhere to be found in the plain language of 
§ 230, and that absolute immunity was never the intent.248 
Identifiable forces seem to be at play in this development. 
One is the finding of the early cases such as Zeran that the CDA 
provides “broad immunity” with scarcely a reference to the 
intent of Congress to limit access to explicit materials. Indeed, 
this is not surprising given that Zeran and many of the earlier 
cases were defamations cases—a chief concern of service pro-
viders. As such, it in some way makes sense that their reference 
to the other purposes of § 230 is limited. 
However, two trends have occurred since those early cases. 
First, Congress declared sex trafficking a crime in 2000249 and 
created a private right of action as an essential enforcement 
tool in 2003.250 Congress went on to emphasize the importance 
of both the private right of civil suit for survivors of trafficking 
as well as the essential role state and local entities play in com-
batting what Congress has labeled “modern slavery.”251 
Secondly, sex trafficking has exploded in large part due to 
the Internet.252 Once it became apparent that these websites of-
fered a place where traffickers could actually advertise victims 
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for sale with impunity, the problem only grew. 253  While 
Craigslist and Backpage were and are the largest online sites, 
others, some even more egregious, have emerged.254 Addition-
ally, related online websites have developed where purchasers 
rate their victims in the most egregious of terms—a veritable 
Yelp system to rate prostituted persons—many of whom are 
victims of trafficking.255 
As a result, courts have struggled to reconcile these two 
manifestations of congressional intent. Yet when they turn to 
precedent for guidance, they are met with a series of pre-sex 
trafficking cases asserting a “broad immunity.” They are guid-
ed to this by litigants that argue for unprecedented immuni-
ty—immunity that would not be present if they were brick-
and-mortar companies engaged in the exact same behaviors. 
Yet amici, many of whom are significantly funded by techno-
logical companies, also argue that this de facto absolute im-
munity applies to otherwise-criminal conduct. 256 This is not-
withstanding the fact that: 
The [CDA] was not meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land 
on the Internet. The CDA instead prevents website hosts 
from being liable when they elect to block and screen offen-
sive material, and it encourages the development of the In-
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ternet by not permitting courses of action, such as defama-
tion, that would treat the web host as the publisher or 
speaker of objectionable material. Neither of these directives 
requires us to blindly accept the early premise of “broad 
immunity.”257 
The judicial inability to keep § 230 tied to its original intent has 
added to confusion. 
2. Curious Record of Congressional Action and Inaction 
Given the growth of sex trafficking fueled by online advertis-
ing, the lack of congressional action is remarkable. This Article 
opened with a discussion of justice and injustice. It is here that 
comparison between congressional action in 1996 and 2017 is 
necessary. 
In 1996 Congress sought to regulate aspects of the Internet 
related to explicit material, pornography, and children. 258 In 
response to the opposition to the CDA by service providers 
and one arguably wrongly decided case, Prodigy, Congress in-
cluded § 230 in the CDA. Congress made an effort to address a 
nascent Internet and a concern about explicit material. Con-
gress, in 1996, responded to one bad case and the perceived 
need of corporate interests to enact § 230. 
Until late 2017, Congress was unresponsive to several poorly 
decided cases and the actual needs of sex-trafficking survivors, 
yet it continued to be responsive to the corporate interests of 
the tech industry. By 2017, every other institution in society has 
called for an amendment to the CDA, including victims and 
survivors, 259  survivor victims’ organizations, 260  law enforce-
ment,261 all fifty state attorneys general,262 and several courts. 
California courts have expressed reservation in dismissing 
criminal charges, and noted that Congress must act to clarify 
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the status of the law because it is functioning as a protection to 
human traffickers: “If and until Congress sees fit to amend the 
immunity law, the broad reach of § 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act even applies to those alleged to support the ex-
ploitation of others by human trafficking.”263 As far back as 
2009, a U.S. district court sounded the alarm when dismissing 
an early sex-trafficking case, finding that “Congress has de-
clared such websites to be immune from suits arising from 
such injuries. It is for Congress to change the policy that gave 
rise to such immunity.”264 The First Circuit directed survivors 
to pursue legislative change after expanding CDA protection to 
criminal activity.265 
It is remarkable that the 1996 Congress, with little infor-
mation on what the Internet would become, was willing to re-
spond to the objections of one group and the decision of one 
court. Yet, when faced with a mountain of information—much 
of which is from the government itself—about the harm of 
these advertising sites, no congressional action occurred. In 
2008, Congress enacted legislation demanding an annual report 
to Congress on efforts to combat child sexual exploitation. A 
“key finding” of the 2016 National Strategy was that 
“[w]ebsites like Backpage.com have emerged as a primary ve-
hicle for the advertisement of children to engage in prostitu-
tion.”266 Yet, Congress has not amended the CDA to hold such 
websites accountable. 
The numerous cases that have seemed to thwart the TVPA’s 
intent also did not spark Congress to set § 230 right. Instead, 
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Congress allowed the regime of de facto absolute immunity to 
thrive, causing courts to assert that § 230 even protects compa-
nies from allegations of criminal activity. This has continued 
even as courts ask Congress to clarify the state of the law. Ob-
servers have offered many explanations for why § 230 has not 
been amended. One is the power of the tech industry.267 The 
tech industry’s resistance to amendment of § 230 is not surpris-
ing because it offers them a competitive advantage against 
brick-and-mortar competitors, as well as immunity for all their 
activities. Indeed, at the time of pending legislation, not only 
had the industry actively opposed the legislation, it was seek-
ing similar immunity to be added into the NAFTA renegotia-
tions.268 
IV. FUTURE 
A. Recent Legislative Actions 
Starting in 2016, some movement in Congress occurred to 
address this narrow issue of de facto immunity for service pro-
viders that partnered with sex traffickers. This was due to a 
number of factors, the most pressing of which included revela-
tions regarding the activities of one of the major online adver-
tising sites, Backpage. 
It is important to remember that when these entities success-
fully win a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the case is dismissed prior to 
discovery. As a result, these defendants can successfully shield 
their illegal activity from scrutiny. Backpage’s litigation and 
lobbying strategy included both denying the accusations and 
asserting that it was, in fact, helping to stop sex trafficking.269 
The plaintiffs and state attorneys general were caught in an 
impossible situation: they could gather some information to 
form the basis of their allegations, but to truly obtain the doc-
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umentation of internal corporate workings needed to prove 
their arguments at trial, they needed to obtain discovery. Yet 
they were precluded from doing so, due to Backpage’s success-
ful efforts to have cases dismissed before discovery. 
As early as 2011, Backpage’s outsized role in sex trafficking 
had started to raise concerns. Forty-five state attorneys general 
authored a letter outlining several cases involving Backpage, 
labeling it a “hub” of sex trafficking and requesting documents 
regarding its business practices. 270 In April 2015, the Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations began an investiga-
tion into Internet sex trafficking.271 As part of that investigation, 
the Subcommittee sought records and testimony from Back-
page and its officers. Backpage refused to comply. Over several 
months, Backpage’s non-compliance continued, culminating in 
Backpage’s CEO, Carl Ferrer, failing to appear before Congress 
under order of a subpoena.272 As a result, for only the fifth time 
in forty years, the United States Senate unanimously adopted a 
resolution directing Senate Legal Counsel to bring an action 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1365 in federal court to enforce its subpoe-
na.273 
Carl Ferrer and Backpage objected, asserting numerous First 
Amendment arguments in opposition to the subpoenas. The 
District Court for the District of Columbia rejected all of them. 
The court noted that Backpage had successfully invoked § 230 
to avoid liability and that congressional interest in sex 
trafficking and in Backpage’s procedures is legitimate.274 In so 
doing, the court made several important statements about the 
breadth of Ferrer’s First Amendment claims: 
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The First Amendment does not give Mr. Ferrer an “unlim-
ited license to talk” or to publish any content he chooses. 
The Supreme Court has consistently rejected [this view] 
throughout its history . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he Constitution also tells us that Mr. Ferrer cannot use 
the First Amendment as an omnipotent and unbreakable 
shield to prevent Congress from properly exercising its con-
stitutional authority.275 
After more extensive document review as the case went 
through the appellate courts, the Senate Subcommittee on In-
vestigations finally issued its report. 
The report’s title, “Backpage.com’s Knowing Facilitation of 
Online Sex Trafficking,”276 indicates its conclusion. The report 
finds that for years, Backpage had falsely and publicly denied 
that it was involved in any work with sex traffickers and had 
held itself out as a leader in protecting people from abuse.277 
Indeed, this denial was in the face of allegations from Thomas 
Dart, J.S., Jane Doe, and M.A. The Senate Subcommittee found 
that “internal company documents obtained by the Subcom-
mittee conclusively show that Backpage’s public defense is a 
fiction.”278 The Report goes on to make three main findings. 
First, Backpage knowingly concealed evidence of criminality 
by editing its advertisements and deleting some words to avoid 
law enforcement detection. Nevertheless, it still published the 
advertisement even though this filter “changed nothing about 
the true nature of the advertised transaction or real age of the 
person being sold for sex.”279 Second, Backpage knowingly fa-
cilitated child sex trafficking.280 Finally, Backpage misleadingly 
claimed that it was sold to a foreign entity when, in fact, 
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through a series of shell corporations, Carl Ferrer, Michael 
Lacey, and James Larkin had remained its owners. These indi-
viduals structured the transactions to hide the fact that they 
retained ownership.281 
Despite the scathing nature of this report, Congress took no 
immediate action to amend the CDA. This was the case, even 
though a major reason this information did not come to light 
was Backpage’s ability to use § 230 to prevent civil cases from 
reaching the discovery phase, and to enjoin state criminal laws 
aimed at such actions. In July 2017, however, a Washington Post 
investigation uncovered further evidence of Backpage partner-
ing with a contractor in the Philippines to create content and 
facilitate prostitution, from which Backpage profits. The Post 
noted, “For years, Backpage executives have adamantly denied 
claims made by members of Congress, state attorneys general, 
law enforcement and sex-abuse victims that the site has facili-
tated prostitution and child sex trafficking.”282 
Then, in August of 2017, Senators Rob Portman and Richard 
Blumenthal introduced the Stop Enabling Sex Trafficking Act 
(SESTA) in the Senate.283 Earlier that year, Representative Ann 
Wagner introduced the Allow States and Victims to Fight 
Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) in the House of Represent-
atives.284 Both bills sought to address the actual problem raised 
by the courts: § 230 immunity. 
These bills were originally met with staunch opposition. 
Google called SESTA “a disaster”285 and “a mistake of historic 
proportions,”286 and dispatched its top lobbyist, former Con-
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gresswoman Susan Molinari, to lead the charge against the leg-
islation.287 
In the fall of 2017, however, tech companies such as Google, 
Facebook, and Twitter faced pressure from another front. It 
was revealed that their sites were used by the Russian govern-
ment to spread disinformation and possibly affect the 2016 
Presidential election.288 This revelation, combined with a dis-
cussion of the role of social media in inspiring white suprema-
cy and violence, caused some to question the passivity with 
which tech companies approached third-party content.289 After 
the revelation of Russia’s use of social media to influence the 
election, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Ter-
rorism held a hearing regarding this passivity. At the hearing, 
senators raised numerous questions about the need for gov-
ernment regulation because of those companies’ failure to 
act.290 
During this hearing, representatives from Google, Facebook, 
and Twitter repeatedly testified about the work they were do-
ing to self-regulate, despite a growth in sex trafficking and dis-
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information.291 They made similar claims to the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence the following day.292 Some senators 
expressed frustration and skepticism.293 At least one senator, 
John Cornyn, expressly connected tech companies’ inaction 
with their opposition to the legislation to amend the CDA.294 
After two days of this testimony, the Internet Association re-
versed a months-long campaign and announced its support for 
an amended SESTA with newly drafted changes in its favor.295 
The Internet Association is the trade association representing 
global Internet companies, though it is unclear how many of 
their members actually support the legislation or even if the 
Internet Association itself actually does.296 
This tactical move should not have been surprising. Consid-
ering the scrutiny facing tech and its ability to lobby for even 
more concessions in this narrower version of SESTA, support-
ing SESTA was a small price to pay to be able to point to an 
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action for the common good. Notably, however, Google and 
Facebook did not vigorously support SESTA, and groups tied 
to Google and Facebook continued to oppose it.297 
The Internet Association’s one statement in public support of 
SESTA, however, was belied by tech’s actions in the House re-
garding FOSTA.298 Initially, of the two bills, FOSTA was the 
more forceful, holding companies responsible for recklessly 
disregarding sex trafficking on their platforms. Therefore, it 
was unsurprising that the Internet Association claimed support 
for SESTA and not FOSTA after congressional scrutiny. How-
ever, some observers have speculated that this was a ruse, par-
ticularly because once SESTA gained traction in the Senate, 
tech moved its efforts to stop any amendment to the CDA to 
the House of Representatives.299 
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Tech companies opposed both SESTA and FOSTA when they 
were introduced, treating the bills as equally harmful to their 
business and unnecessary. In its original form, however, FOS-
TA was the more aggressive of the two as it included language 
regarding child pornography and proposed a lower mens rea 
standard of recklessness. 300  This bill also directly amended 
§ 230 to deny immunity from state and federal private rights of 
action as well as state sex-trafficking and child pornography 
criminal laws.301 However, FOSTA changed significantly after 
SESTA gained momentum. 
Within one week of the Internet Association publicly sup-
porting the bill, the Senate Commerce Committee voted the 
SESTA substitute out of Committee. This event was unprece-
dented. For years victim and survivor groups had been unable 
to motivate Congress to clarify § 230. Now, for the first time, 
the Senate was questioning big tech’s blanket immunity. While 
it at first appeared that tech organizations had bowed to pres-
sure, it seems that they just moved the battleground to the 
House of Representatives. The day after SESTA passed the 
Senate Committee, Senator Ron Wyden, one of the original au-
thors of § 230, put a hold on the bill, despite numerous survi-
vors urging him not to do so.302 In November, over thirty anti-
trafficking organizations and advocates wrote a joint letter to 
members of the House objecting to efforts to propose a new 
FOSTA bill.303 Within weeks, the House Judiciary Committee 
proposed a new version of FOSTA over victims’ and survivors’ 
objections, and the new Goodlatte FOSTA substitute version 
was met with uproar from the victim community. This version 
no longer included a private right of action on the federal or 
the state level.304 Instead it was unresponsive to § 230 problems 
and created a new federal offense regarding prostitution.305 
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The language of this new version can be traced back to an 
October 2017 House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terror-
ism, Homeland Security, and Investigations. The subcommittee 
held a hearing on FOSTA in which tech trade associations pro-
posed this approach. At that hearing, one of the original au-
thors of § 230, Chris Cox, testified as a witness.306 It is no sur-
prise that as a representative from southern California, he 
worked with lawyers from Prodigy and AOL to create § 230 
immunity. At the hearing on amending the CDA, Cox testified 
not in his capacity as a former congressman, but as a paid rep-
resentative for NetChoice,307 a trade group of tech companies 
partially funded by Google. 
Cox acknowledged that “Section 230 was never intended to 
provide legal protection to websites that promote sex traffick-
ing,”308 that “in enacting Section 230, it was not [Congress’s] 
intent to create immunity for criminal and tortious activity on 
the internet,”309 and that Congress intended a federal policy 
“that is entirely consistent with robust enforcement of state 
criminal and civil law.”310 This would seem to suggest that there 
was a willingness to amend § 230 to clarify those powers. 
However, the Cox-NetChoice proposal went out of its way to 
propose everything but amending § 230. Rather, the Cox-
NetChoice proposal was to have Congress reaffirm that § 230 
does not provide immunity for content creators.311 This was not 
                                                                                                                               
 306. Online Sex Trafficking and the Communications Decency Act: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations of the H. Comm. 
of the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017) ) [hereinafter Online Sex Trafficking Hearing] 
(statement of Chris Cox, Outside Counsel, NetChoice), https://judiciary.
house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Testimony-of-Chris-Cox-NetChoice.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UD82-LW55]. 
 307. Id.; see also Tom Jackman, House committee targets online sex trafficking by 




 308. Online Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 306, at ii; see also id. at 1 (“It was 
equally intended to ensure that those who actually commit wrongs will be subject 
to prosecution by both civil and criminal law enforcement.”); id. at 3 (“[T]he inves-
tigation and prosecution of sex trafficking must not be impeded by federal law 
meant to protect the innocent and punish the guilty.”). 
 309. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
 310. Id. at 10 (emphasis added). 
 311. Id. at 11. 
612 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 41 
 
responsive to the articulated concerns regarding § 230. The 
Cox-NetChoice proposal then suggested creating a different 
federal crime attached to the Travel Act.312 
The Goodlatte substitute FOSTA mirrored the Cox-
NetChoice proposal, except instead of amending the Travel 
Act, it amended the Mann Act and targeted prostitution.313 In 
so doing, it removed any substantive amendment to § 230 for 
human trafficking civil suits, and only carved out the ability for 
states to prosecute under the new Mann Act statutes if they 
passed such a law on the state level. It did retain the ability of 
state prosecutors to prosecute violations of § 1591 on the state 
level. The House Judiciary Committee passed this out of com-
mittee notwithstanding opposition from all major national vic-
tim survivors groups and survivors, who noted that they pub-
licly withdrew their support and asked the co-sponsors to do 
the same.314 
It bears noting that, notwithstanding critics commenting that 
these bills would alter the Internet, that view has been signifi-
cantly rejected. Professor Citron and Mr. Wittes convincingly 
argue that amending the CDA “will not break” the Internet and 
that it is the natural historical cycle to have a new industry un-
regulated in its early years, after which the industry grows to a 
point that it needs some regulation.315 Many tech companies, 
including Oracle, Walt Disney, Hewlett Packard, 21st Century 
Fox, IBM, and the Recording Industry Association of America, 
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have come to support one or both bills.316 Each bill was six pag-
es or less and neither was radical. While at one time, the bills 
were similar, this legislative move by tech created two different 
bills, only one supported by victims and survivors. SESTA clar-
ified § 230. FOSTA created a new prostitution-focused federal 
crime, but did not significantly alter § 230, thus allowing § 230 
to remain an obstacle to victims’ access to justice. 
1. Goodlatte Substitute FOSTA 
It appeared in February 2018 that the legislative effort to 
amend § 230 would fail. The Goodlatte Substitute FOSTA sup-
ported by tech companies seeking to preserve de facto absolute 
immunity was  substantially different from SESTA in the Sen-
ate. 
In its original form, FOSTA sought to accomplish the same 
goals as SESTA, but in a slightly more comprehensive manner. 
For example, it had a mens rea of recklessness.317 Further, the 
original FOSTA recognized the connection between sex traf-
ficking and child pornography, which is referred to as child 
sexual exploitation in the criminal code.318 Child pornography 
constitutes a visual depiction of a child engaged in sexually 
explicit conduct.319 Some of these advertisements meet the fed-
eral definition of child pornography, and the original FOSTA 
sought to disallow immunity for a site that knowingly or reck-
lessly engages in such conduct. 320  Additionally, the original 
FOSTA sought not only to allow state criminal law to be en-
forced, but also victim restitution under any state criminal 
statutes for sex trafficking and child pornography as well as a 
private right of action on both the state and federal levels.321  
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However, the original FOSTA bore little resemblance to the 
Goodlatte substitute. SESTA and the original FOSTA were re-
sponsive to the problem identified by the courts, survivors, and 
state prosecutors: § 230 immunity. The Goodlatte FOSTA sub-
stitute follows the Cox-NetChoice proposal: it proposed a new 
criminal law having nothing to do with the § 230 immunity 
problem, it repeats the language of § 230, and it codifies some 
of the problematic case law that has precluded victim and sur-
vivor access to justice. 
Central to the Goodlatte FOSTA substitute was the creation 
of a new crime: Promotion or Facilitation of Prostitution and 
Reckless Disregard of Sex Trafficking.322 This section is non-
responsive to the § 230 immunity issue. The problem regarding 
online advertising of trafficking victims has not been a lack of 
laws. For nearly two decades sex trafficking, conspiring to en-
gage in sex trafficking, and facilitating sex trafficking have 
been illegal federally and today every state has sex-trafficking 
laws. The problem is that state prosecutors cannot utilize their 
laws because of § 230, and courts such as the First Circuit and 
California Superior Court have stated that until Congress 
amends § 230, websites seem to be immune from prosecution 
even if partnering with human traffickers. While there likely is 
value to a criminal charge for promoting prostitution, this has 
never been the problem at issue in the § 230 debate. 
The proposed crime is an amendment to the Mann Act which 
addresses prostitution that involves interstate commerce. 323 
This makes it illegal to “use[] or operate[] a facility or means of 
interstate of foreign commerce or attempts to do so with the 
intent to promote or facilitate the prostitution of another.”324 
The statute has an aggravated penalty if the offender promotes 
or facilitates the prostitution of five or more people or “acts in 
reckless disregard of the fact that such conduct contributed to 
sex trafficking in violation of 1591(a).”325 
If the statute stopped with this provision, it could possibly 
have helped address the issue of prostitution websites that are 
                                                                                                                               
 322. H.R. 1865 § 3 (as reported to House, Feb. 20, 2018). 
 323. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–24 (2012). 
 324. H.R. 1865 § 3(a) (as reported to House, Feb. 20, 2018). 
 325. Id. 
No. 2] The Indecency of Section 230 615 
 
clearly related to sex trafficking. The Goodlatte Substitute 
FOSTA, however, required proof that a website intentionally 
facilitated prostitution. Intent requires the showing of purpose-
ful or knowingly facilitating prostitution. As a result, the use of 
code language, innuendo, and ambiguity that is prevalent in 
these ads present similar challenges to prosecutors. Nonethe-
less, if the proposed new crime were simply these provisions, it 
could be another tool in the federal prosecutor’s arsenal to fight 
prostitution, even though it does nothing to address the § 230 
problem. 
However, the proposal did not end there. In the section enti-
tled “Civil Recovery” the proposal stated a victim of this new 
statute may recover damages in federal court.326 This seemed to 
allow a federal civil right of action, but the proposal was very 
deceptive. The next sentence gutted this intent by stating, 
“Consistent with section 230 [of the CDA,] a defendant may be 
held liable, under this subsection, where promotion or facilita-
tion of prostitution activity includes responsibility for the creation 
or development in whole or in part of the information or content pro-
vided.”327 This language is exactly like the Cox-NetChoice pro-
posal and was proposed precisely because it did not create a 
private right of action. It simply repeated the language of § 230, 
which has been interpreted to mean that a website is immune 
from prosecution or civil action unless it is a content creator. 
Most of the prior cases except J.S. have found that the allega-
tions against such websites are precluded because “claims that 
a website facilitates illegal conduct through its posting rules 
necessarily treat the website as a publisher or speaker of con-
tent provided by third parties and, thus, are precluded by sec-
tion 230(c)(1).”328  
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Additionally, this version provided an affirmative defense if 
the defendant can establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that prostitution is legal in the jurisdiction where the ad “was 
targeted.”329 Given the global nature of the Internet, this was a 
significant loophole. “Targeted” was undefined and could 
mean anywhere geographically close to such locations. It is le-
gal to sell sex in Canada,330 parts of Mexico,331 and certain coun-
ties in Nevada. 332  Furthermore, there are efforts to legalize 
prostitution in various states throughout the country, including 
in Washington, D.C., California and New Hampshire.333 With 
this broad affirmative defense, a website could simply assert it 
was “targeting” an audience in one of these locations and be 
exempt from suit in every state that borders Canada, Mexico, 
or Nevada. Similarly, with the term “targeted” undefined, it is 
unclear if that means the act would have to take place there, the 
prostituted person be located there, or if the potential purchas-
er be located there. 
The Goodlatte FOSTA substitute referenced § 230 and al-
lowed for state prosecution of violations of state sex-trafficking 
laws for conduct that would violate 18 U.S.C. § 1592(a).334 Thus, 
this version did allow states to prosecute websites under this 
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provision. While it also allowed states to prosecute under state 
laws for conduct violating the proposed § 2421A, this could 
require states to pass a law substantially similar to this new 
statute. Given that it took over a decade for every state to pass 
a human trafficking law, this would be no small task. Moreo-
ver, just as tech companies have successfully fought and op-
posed the effort to pass state laws that prohibit facilitating 
online sex trafficking, they will fight such statutes in every 
state. Given that tech companies will be joined by those seeking 
to legalize prostitution, the chances of a state passing such a 
law appear to be low. Consequently, this provision offers little 
to the state attorneys general who have not endorsed this bill 
but who asked Congress to simply amend § 230 to include state 
human trafficking laws on the list of exemptions from § 230 
immunity. 
2. SESTA 
The focus of SESTA is on the shortfalls of § 230 and the de-
mand of courts for clarification, of survivors for access to jus-
tice, and of state prosecutors for the ability to enforce their own 
human trafficking laws. Its new focus is on amending § 230 to 
include sex trafficking as exempt from § 230 immunity. 
Congress did not originally include sex trafficking because 
sex trafficking was not recognized as a federal crime until four 
years after the passage of the CDA. SESTA clarifies this by in-
cluding the non-controversial statement that it is the policy of 
the United States to “ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal 
criminal and civil law relating to sex trafficking.”335 SESTA also 
provides for the CDA to not preclude a civil action brought 
under § 1595 for sex-trafficking offenses or any state law crimi-
nal prosecution for actions that would violate sex-trafficking 
laws.336 This provision would seem to resolve the ambiguity 
created by the First Circuit when it expanded § 230 immunity 
to preclude civil cases under § 1595. Therefore, under SESTA, 
victims have access to the private right of action in federal 
court created under § 1595, and state prosecutors have the abil-
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ity to enforce state sex-trafficking laws that cover behavior ille-
gal under § 1591.  
SESTA does not amend § 230 to allow for a private right of 
action on the state level. However, it does amend § 1595 to al-
low state attorneys general to sue a website in a federal court 
on behalf of citizens who have been threatened or adversely 
affected by a city’s violation of § 1591.337 This provision appears 
to be modeled after the state enforcement provision of the Con-
sumer Review Fairness Act.338 While not a private right of ac-
tion for victims, it is an additional avenue to hold websites that 
facilitate sex trafficking accountable. 
SESTA also responds to the First Circuit’s concern that § 1591 
does not define “participation in a venture.” The revised Senate 
Bill defines “participation in a venture” as “knowingly assis-
ting, supporting, or facilitating a violation of subsection 
(a)(1).”339 
3. Emergence of a FOSTA-SESTA Compromise 
With only one bill, SESTA, having the support of survivors, 
law enforcement, and the tech industry, it appeared Congress 
was in a logjam. When the Goodlatte Substitute FOSTA came 
to a floor vote, however, a significant amendment by Con-
gresswoman Mimi Walters emerged. This amendment effec-
tively preserved the positive components of SESTA, but added 
the new Mann Act crime that Congressman Goodlatte claimed 
essential to combatting online sex trafficking. 340  This new 
House FOSTA eliminated the language that would have codi-
fied de facto absolute immunity, included the federal private 
right of action, and enabled enforcement of state sex-trafficking 
laws.341 The legislation with the Walters amendments gained 
the backing of those who supported SESTA and was passed 
overwhelmingly in the House 388–25. 342  Having passed the 
House, this version went to the Senate for a vote. 
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This SESTA-FOSTA compromise states that § 230 “was never 
intended to provide legal protection to websites that unlawful-
ly promote and facilitate prostitution and websites that facili-
tate traffickers in advertising the sale of unlawful sex acts with 
sex trafficking victims.”343 It further states that clarification of 
§ 230 of the Communications Act of 1934 is warranted to en-
sure that that section does not provide legal protection to such 
websites.344 
The compromise includes the new Mann Act charge of pro-
motion or facilitation of prostitution.345 Critically, however, the 
compromise explicitly eliminates § 230 immunity against civil 
claims under § 1595 for sex-trafficking violations and state 
criminal charges, if the conduct is an alleged violation of state 
sex-trafficking laws, the new promotion of prostitution provi-
sion, or other federal law.346 It also defines the term, “participa-
tion in a venture,” which is unlawful when the venture is sex 
trafficking, and which the First Circuit noted had not yet been 
defined. This is now defined to encompass “knowingly assist-
ing, supporting, or facilitating sex trafficking.”347 The legisla-
tion also enables state attorneys general to bring a parens patri-
ae civil suit against a website on behalf of state residents.348 
Finally, the legislation includes a savings clause, ensuring that 
claims currently allowed under federal or state law, such as 
those in J.S., remain permissible.349 
On March 21, 2018, this compromise bill came to a vote in the 
Senate. If this compromise bill were accepted without change 
by the Senate the FOSTA-SESTA compromise would become 
law upon the President’s signature. Suddenly, amending § 230 
was in reach. 
Senator Ron Wyden, the same Senator who attempted to 
stop the bill by placing a hold on SESTA, made a last ditch ef-
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fort to derail the legislation. This came in the form of two 
amendments. The first purported to provide additional fund-
ing to the Department of Justice to combat human trafficking. 
While this gesture may appear to represent an effort to stem 
sex trafficking, it was actually a transparent attempt to halt the 
bill. If the compromise bill was amended in any way, it would 
eventually be required to return to the House for a vote. The 
House would never have accepted such a spending increase, 
and the bill would have died. This amendment was resound-
ingly rejected by the Senate.350 
Senator Wyden’s second amendment tried to water down 
some of the provisions to protect interactive service provid-
ers.351 After the defeat of his funding amendment, however, he 
withdrew this second amendment.352 Still, he warned that he 
would “turn back to this topic in short order . . . for a vote at 
that time.”353 Curiously, he stated that his reason for withdraw-
al was that his colleagues faced “so much political headwind” 
to vote against this version of an anti-trafficking bill.354 This is 
curious, because for many years Congress would not even en-
tertain and changes to § 230 in light of tech opposition. For 
years, Congress ignored the pleas of sex-trafficking survivors 
and allied itself with the tech industry. The notion that politi-
cians are beholden to survivors is belied by the near-decade 
wait to amend this law. 
B. Consider the Big Picture 
If it took over fifteen years for Congress to act regarding this 
specific, yet obvious, problem on the Internet, how much more 
time will it take for Congress to respond to the more funda-
mental problem of the CDA? Congress was correct about two 
facts in 1996: the Internet was a nascent industry, perhaps in 
need of some support to get off the ground, and its potential 
for distributing exploitative material was massive. Now the 
Internet is no longer nascent—it is as vital as a utility and as 
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powerful as a superstate. Rather than simply distributing ex-
ploitative material, it is exploitative itself. A massive exploita-
tive industry is one perhaps in no need of special protections at 
all. Rather, the time has come to examine not whether the gov-
ernment should protect citizens from these powerful indus-
tries, but how it should do so. The current system of allowing 
online businesses to avoid responsibility for “either for what 
their users do or for the harm that their services can cause”355 
must be reexamined. 
V. CONCLUSION 
History tells us that many industries in their infancy thrive 
with little regulation. When they reach a certain size and im-
port to the citizenry, however, the government may need to 
regulate them for the sake of public health and safety. Rail-
roads, utilities, and finance have all experienced this cycle.356 
Congress must now consider the viability of a legal regime in 
which online companies profit from social ills and then claim 
immunity from criminal liability. 
But that is a question for another day. The pressing problem 
facing society is the open market to sexually traffic the most 
vulnerable, and the de facto absolute immunity created by 
courts for the market operators. It appears that congressional 
action challenging this unintended immunity required signifi-
cant pressure from victims, courts, and state officials. In the 
meantime, the victimized continued to be denied justice. 
In 1996, Congress responded to one unpopular court deci-
sion by legislation to protect tech companies from a perceived 
threat. After years of online advertisements selling sex-
trafficking victims and numerous other victims, court deci-
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sions, and state legislators calling for clarification of legislation, 
Congress failed to respond. Instead, it appeared to continue to 
protect the tech industry. Now, finally Congress has acted to 
close this legal loophole. The story for sex-trafficking survivors 
and their families was one of injustice; now it has become one 
of justice delayed. While the new legislation is a positive step, 
delayed justice is not without cost. The cost was borne by hun-
dreds of trafficking victims, sold online and raped repeatedly 
while Congress failed to act. 
